On Law's Tiebreakers
Adam M. Samahat
Tiebreakersare familiar tools for decisionmaking.Ready examples include penalty shootouts in soccer matches and vice presidents breaking tie votes in the Senate. But
we lack a precise understanding of the concept and a normative theory for the use of
tiebreakers.This Article strictly defines a tiebreaker as a kind of lexically inferior decision rule and then builds justificationsfor tiebreakingdecision structures. Concentrating
on situations in which ties are considered intolerable,the Article suggests methods for
either preventing ties or designing sensible tiebreakers. As to the latter, tradeoffs are
identified for the use of random variables, morally relevant variables, and doublecounted variables within a lexically inferiordecision rule. Finally,the Article applies its
conceptual and normative lessons to three problems: the best design for affirmative
action programs,the proper interpretive method for legal texts, and the core function of
adjudication.The closing sections evaluate law and adjudicationas one large tiebreaker
for the rest of social life, with contrasts and comparisons to some other major theories
for the mission of courts in the United States.
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can .... Never stir up litigation. A worse man can
scarcely be found than one who does this.

-Abraham Lincoln'
If now, the trier is operating under a system which requires him to
decide the question one way or the other, then to avoid caprice that
system must furnish him with a rule for deciding the question when
he finds his mind in this kind of doubt or equipoise.

-Fleming James, Jr2
They were men of their times, and they were responding to the
norms of their times-to the hidden voices of the zeitgeist.

-Lawrence M. Friedman
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INTRODUCTION

Tiebreaking is a familiar practice, especially in games. At critical
junctures in a sporting contest, the rules of the game will prescribe a
method for declaring a winner when the competitors are otherwise
even. A tennis set tied at six games might be awarded to the winner
of a special one-game tiebreaker, a deadlocked soccer match might
be settled with a penalty shootout, and a football game might linger
into sudden death overtime. Draws are sometimes tolerated, even at
the end of a game. But the desire for drama generated by a decisive
result within a limited time frame seems to motivate game designers
to deploy tiebreakers.
Tiebreakers exist outside the gaming context as well, in places
where entertainment cannot be the justification. In a wide variety of
situations, people rely on tiebreakers, at least in a loose sense of the
word. Public and private decisionmaking bodies routinely break tie
votes by declaring that the motion fails,' tied candidate elections are
sometimes resolved by drawing lots,' and a motorist should yield right
when reaching an intersection at the same time as another motorist.
For their part, courts respond to equipoise with an assortment of
norms-such as the rule that civil defendants prevail when each side's
evidence is equally persuasive, that judgments are affirmed by equally
divided appellate panels, that constitutional trial errors are deemed
harmful when the habeas judge cannot tell one way or the other, and
that an agency's reasonable interpretation prevails when a statute
seems ambiguous.' Even the Constitution of the United States has a
tiebreaker. If and only if voting senators are "equally divided," the
vice president may vote and thereby break the tie.'
Despite numerous illustrations, we lack a solid investigation into

4
See Henry M. Robert, III, et al, Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised 392 (Perseus 10th
ed 2000) ("On a tie vote, a motion requiring a majority vote for adoption is lost, since a tie is not
a majority.").
5 See note 13.
6
See text accompanying notes 30-32.
7
See text accompanying notes 201-08.
8 US Const Art I, § 3, cl 4 (stating that the vice president "shall have no Vote, unless they
be equally divided"). Ordinarily, Senate approval of a bill requires majority support from a
quorum of voting senators. See Walter J. Oleszek, Super-Majority Votes in the Senate 1 (CRS
2008), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-779.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2010) (relying on Senate precedent). This rule produces a decisive outcome for numerically tied votes without resort
to a special tiebreaker. See David R. Tarr and Ann O'Connor, eds, Congress A to Z 472 (CQ 4th
ed 2003). But Article I, § 3, clause 4 is nonetheless a "tiebreaker" in the strict sense. See Part I.A.
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the phenomenon and theory of tiebreakers,9 especially in law.o There
is much casual use of the term "tiebreaker" without a working definition of the concept. And there is a practice of tiebreaking without a
systematic attempt to understand the forces that generate ties, the
compulsion to break them, and the best way to do so.
The most fundamental issue is why anyone would design a system
to ensure that ties are broken. Are ties so terrible? Even when they are,
we should know the best ways to prevent or break them. In particular,
we should ask whether a rational decisionmaker would break a tie with
a variable that was relevant to the merits in the first place. Are variables
not simply relevant or irrelevant -rather than relevant only when other
variables cancel out? Other kinds of sequential decision structures
make more immediate sense, such as bifurcating trials and avoiding
unnecessary questions. It is no surprise when people try to prevent considerations relevant to one decision from infecting a different decision,
or to save decision costs by resolving a potentially outcomedeterminative part of the analysis before taking up other parts. But tiebreakers are more peculiar. They are designed to make exactly the
same decision that another decision rule could not handle, and they are
not as flexible as a simple aversion to unnecessary judgments.

9 A large literature in decision theory confronts uncertainty and other forms of indeterminacy. See Jos6 Luis Bermtidez, Decision Theory and Rationality 22-27 (Oxford 2009) (describing basic
elements of expected-utility-maximizing decision theory for such situations); Simon French,
Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality ch 2 (Halsted 1986) (similar);
David Kelsey and John Quiggin, Theories of Choice under Ignorance and Uncertainty, 6 J Econ
Sury 133, 133-42 (1992) (collecting rational choice models). See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality 8-17,107-08 (Cambridge 1989) (suggesting lotteries
when reason runs out); R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions:Introduction
and CriticalSurveys 278-86 (Wiley & Sons 1957) (discussing maximin utility, minimax regret, Hurwicz's best-worst state ratio, and the principle of insufficient reason for dealing with uncertain
probabilities across known outcomes). Consider also Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty:
An InstitutionalTheory of Legal Interpretationch 6 (Harvard 2006) (applying many of these strategies to issues of judicial interpretation). My investigation overlaps these ideas.
10 For some narrower treatments in the law literature on related topics, see Michael P. Healy,
Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation:Interpreting Law or ChangingLaw,
43 Wm & Mary L Rev 539,571-74 (2001) (distinguishing certain canons of construction that operate as tiebreakers); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor ProductsLiability Reform:A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 Yale L J 353, 382-84 (1988) (discussing compensation and consumer autonomy tiebreakers that
judges might use to fashion products liability law); James, 47 Va L Rev at 51-52 (cited in note 2)
(discussing preponderance of the evidence). See also generally Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the
Supreme Court of the United States, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 643 (2002) (defending the rule that
judgments are affirmed whenever the justices are evenly divided); David Kaye, The Limits of the
Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard:Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 487 (1982) (discussing the costs and benefits of various proof
burdens, including for situations of equally persuasive evidence in two-party cases); Michael Coenen, Comment, Original Jurisdiction Deadlocks, 118 Yale L J 1003 (2009) (assessing options for
breaking ties when there is no lower court judgment to affirm).

1664

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:1661

This Article lays a foundation for a theory of tiebreakers, with special attention to law's tiebreakers. Insofar as a legal institution must
serve as a dispute resolution mechanism, ties are acutely troublesome in
that setting. More than fifty years ago, Fleming James suggested that
ties are a sign of distress within a system that cannot eliminate doubt,
that condemns decision by whim, and that nevertheless requires decisionmakers "to decide the question one way or the other."" Legal institutions need strategies for preventing or breaking ties, especially
when selection effects leave them in charge of the most intractable
disputes. Moreover, legal institutions will likely respond to the threat
of a tie in special ways. Mature legal systems might be uniquely able to
end a dispute as a practical matter, yet uniquely unable to acknowledge indeterminacy on issues that are supposed to govern outcomes
on the merits. In any event, law's tiebreaking strategies may differ
from the suggestions of abstract decision theory, and understanding
law's tiebreakers will help us understand legal institutions.
The Article begins by strictly defining a tiebreaker as a type of
lexically inferior decision rule. It also indicates that randomization is
often an ideal tiebreaker, assuming that a tie must be broken and that
there is no moral reason for demoting a relevant variable to tiebreaker status. When randomization is unacceptable, the Article explains
how the probability of a tie can be reduced by moving a relevant variable into a lexically inferior position. The reduction in ties from lexical
ordering is usually greater than the reduction from adding the same
variable to the mix of other relevant considerations. The cost, however, is a higher error rate. A partial solution is to double count a relevant variable in the case of a tie. This kind of double counting might
generate problematic incentives, but sometimes it is the best response
when ties must be broken and when randomization is unavailable.
With these tradeoffs identified, the Article comments on three
applications. The first involves affirmative action. These programs are
sometimes designed as tiebreakers and sometimes not. The second
application involves interpretive method. Some interpretive canons
are formulated as tiebreakers instead of presumptions, and many
scholars suggest that judicial ideology operates in similar fashion. The
third application is much broader and more speculative. I suggest that
the institutions of law-and, more specifically, judicial adjudicationcan be viewed as one large tiebreaker for disputes left unresolved by
11 James, 47 Va L Rev at 51 (cited in note 2). James identified the burden of persuasion as a
device for resolving all cases of doubt or equipoise on questions of fact in litigation. See id at 51-52.
His point is important. Adjustments to the proof burden, however, are "tiebreakers" only in a
loose sense of the word. See Part I.A. My goal is to explore the larger option set for both preventing and breaking ties.
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other arenas of social life. When law and courts are evaluated from
this angle, arbitrariness in adjudication becomes less problematic,
while law's incorporation of values from the rest of society becomes a
potentially beneficial form of double counting.
The Article is organized into three parts. Part I presents loose and
strict definitions of a tiebreaker, and it acknowledges difficulties in specifying the concept. Part II sketches justifications for tiebreaking decision structures, including the prevention of system overload through
screening, the presence of variables that are relevant but nevertheless
morally and categorically less important than others, the convenience of
political compromise, and the threat of otherwise intolerable stalemate.
This Part also identifies types of tiebreakers that are especially attractive when ties are considered intolerable. If not altogether random, tiebreaking variables meant to resolve episodic stalemates should be relatively unimportant, cleanly decisive, and perhaps costly to evaluate;
sometimes they should amount to double counting a relevant variable
in the case of a tie. Part III applies these lessons to affirmative action,
interpretive method, and judicial adjudication.
I. IDENTIFYING TIEBREAKERS

The sort of tiebreaker in which I am interested is easy to grasp as
an intuitive matter, but not so easy to define with the precision necessary for detailed normative evaluation. This Part begins with a general
description of the concept, illustrative examples, and some relatively
formal definitions before proceeding to the resulting complications.
A. Definitions
The gist of the concept involves a decisionmaker resorting to a
special rule of decision to rank options that are somehow indistinguishable without it. The decisionmaker is faced with mutually exclusive options that are equally good, or that seem the same in relevant
ways, or that are incomparable under a prior rule of decision, and yet
she is compelled to select one option over another-to break the tie.
This setup indicates a looming and unwelcome stalemate, along with a
deliberate attempt by decisionmakers to prevent the system from
grinding to a halt. The envisioned system has a method for identifying
indeterminacy and a mechanism for moving forward regardless.
At the end of regulation time in soccer, for example, the ordinary
metric for victory is goals scored. But if the two teams are tied on this
measure, and if a draw is unacceptable, then a so-called penalty shootout
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might be prescribed as the method for selecting the victor." The shootout clearly is a tiebreaker, having no other role than identifying the
winner after regulation-time scoring fails to do so. Another example
involves candidate elections, where the ordinary metric for victory is
the number of lawful votes cast on or by some date. In some jurisdictions, if the top vote-getters are judged to have received the same
number of votes, the victor is selected by a game of chance." Here, lots
are the tiebreakers. A soccer fundamentalist might scoff and say that
penalty shootouts are no different from drawing lots," but the key
thought is that tiebreakers of some kind are used to pick winners in
the wake of both tie scores and tie votes. We can draw on these examples to build working definitions of ties and tiebreakers.
Put simply, "tie" means any equality relevant to an observer." Ties

come in many forms. The soccer and election examples show numerical equalities that are the consequence of uncomplicated evaluative
methods. Only one measure is relevant to ranking the competitors,
and this measure is reduced to a whole number. If, however, we are
interested in the more general topic of options that are difficult to
distinguish, then there is no good reason to restrict the inquiry to
examples like these. There are several well-known impediments to
rank ordering aside from indifference or equipoise with complete
12 See Fdd6ration Internationale de Football Association, Laws of the Game 50-52 (2009),
online at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/federation/81/42/36/lawsofthegameen.pdf
(visited Apr 24, 2010) (describing three approved tiebreaking methods: alternating kicks from
the penalty mark, doubling the value of away goals, and extra time).
13 See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann §16-649(A) (West); Fla Stat Ann § 105.051(1)(c)
(West); Mich Comp Laws § 168.851-52; Minn Stat Ann § 204C.34 (West); NM Stat Ann § 1-13-11;
Va Code § 24.2-674; Wis Stat § 5.01(4)(a); Randal C. Archibold, Election at a Draw,Arizona Town
Cuts a Deck, NY Tunes Al (June 17,2009). See also Finland Election Act pt I, ch 7, §§ 89-90 (1998)
(regarding the ordering by party of candidates for parliament). In Arizona, a tied recall election
goes to the incumbent, see Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 16-649(A)-(E), which is consistent with a kind of
status quo bias present in several of law's tiebreakers. But I know of no statutes that give the tie
to an incumbent in a contested candidateelection.
14 Compare Christian Celind, Penalty Shootouts- There Is an Alternative (May 25, 2008),
online at http://www.soccernews.com/penalty-shootouts (visited Apr 24, 2010) ("Despite its
appeal for drama and excitement,.... a penalty shootout is merely a series of random shots in the
dark."). In the 1970s, coins actually were flipped to decide some soccer matches. See id.
15 See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1233 (Merriam-Webster 10th ed 1999)
(defining "tie" as, among other things, "an equality in number (as of votes or scores)"). I have
added the phrase "relevant to an observer" to flag the fact that a tie depends on the metric that
matters and that different metrics matter to different observers. Furthermore, even if all observers agree on the relevant metric, different observers might come up with different measurements.
Thus competing parties (debaters, say, or litigants) might agree on the relevant issue and disagree
on which argument is better. A third party might begin by-or even end up-thinking that the
arguments of the first two parties are evenly matched. For this third party, there is a tie. And
even from the perspective of the first two parties, there is a tie to the extent they experience an
impasse and feel the need to resolve it somehow. Whether one or the other is correct in an objective sense is another matter and does not affect the social reality of impasse.
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information. To this we can add uncertainty, ignorance, and incommensurability as other forms of indeterminacy." Essential information regarding the likely consequences of possible actions might be impossible to obtain or too costly to gather; or the system might stall because
the decisionmaker is unable or unwilling to rank options that differ
along more than one dimension of value. The appropriate decision
strategy might depend on the type of indeterminacy, of course, but we
can call each a tie.
This inclusive understanding of a "tie" allows for both loose and
strict definitions of a "tiebreaker." I will rule out expansive colloquial
definitions, however, because they will not isolate interesting design
choices regarding decision procedures. Hence, a decisive variable is
not necessarily a tiebreaker for my purposes. If three variables are
relevant to a decision and two of them cancel out, then the remaining
variable can be dubbed "the tiebreaker" in common parlance." But
countless decisions turn on one decisive consideration without the
decisionmaker paying any special attention to the phenomenon of ties.
My interest is the structure and content of decision rules, and so a useful definition of a tiebreaker will describe decision procedures related
16 See Kelsey and Quiggin, 6 J Econ Sury at 133-42 (cited in note 9) (distinguishing decision under (1) risk, where the probabilities for a set of consequences in a set of states are objectively known for each proposed action, (2) uncertainty, where probabilities are not objectively
known, and (3) ignorance and deeper forms of uncertainty, where not even the set of states is
known or where the states-consequences structure is not known); Elster, Solomonic Judgements
at 8-17 (cited in note 9) (itemizing ways in which rational choice theory may fail to recommend a
unique result); Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertaintyand Profit 20,231-34 (Houghton Mifflin 1921)
(distinguishing mere risk from uncertainty). For a brief and nontechnical discussion of uncertain-

ty and uncertainty aversion, see Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and ContractualCon-

ditions, 34 Del J Corp L 755,763-69 (2009). Common definitions of incommensurability exclude
cases in which the observer can say that two choices are equally valuable, see, for example, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 322 (Oxford 1986) ("A and B are incommensurate if it is
neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value."), so I am
using the term "equality" very loosely so as to include incommensurability.
Work on actual human behavior under conditions of "uncertainty" seems focused on decisionmaking under known or estimated risks, especially stated risks. See, for example, Ralph Hertwig,
The Psychology and Rationality of Decisions from Experience (unpublished manuscript, 2009),

online at http://psycho.unibas.ch/en/datensaetze/departments/cognitive-and-decision-sciencest
recent-publicationslabteilung/cognitive-and-decision-sciences/ (making this observation and investigating how people react to their experience with risk in contrast to their reactions to described
probabilities); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Variants of Uncertainty, in Daniel Kalneman,
Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgmentunder Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases 509, 515-20

(Cambridge 1982) (discussing uncertainty in terms of probabilities and confidence levels).
17
See, for example, Metropolitan Life Insurance v Glenn, 128 S Ct 2343, 2351 (2008) (recognizing that "any one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced"); Matt Weiser, California PanelAdds New Marine Sanctuary Zone, Sacramento Bee 3A

(Aug 6,2009) (identifying the new commissioner as the tiebreaker in a 3-2 vote); Karen DeMasters, Districting Tiebreaker,NY Times NJ5 (July 22,2001) (describing the nonpartisan appointee
to a commission as the tiebreaker).
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to ties rather than variables that happen to break them. Neither the
go-ahead goal nor the swing voter will count as a tiebreaker in the
analysis below.
Furthermore, only a subset of all decision rules should qualify as
tiebreakers. Otherwise the territory is too large to address in one pass.
But which subset? Every decision rule breaks a tie broadly speaking,
in the sense that decision rules are supposed to rank options and the
best option cannot be clear before the observer in question applies the
rule. Even if we demand that a tie be broken beyond mere resolution
of an issue through the application of a decision rule, most rules will
still qualify as tiebreakers. Suppose that an observer cares about voting strength and that there are an equal number of votes for and
against a motion. Any decision rule that tells us whether the motion
passes could be called a tiebreaker, including: (1) unanimous consent
is necessary for passage; (2) majority support is necessary for passage;
(3) the side with the most votes prevails and, if the vote is tied, flip a
coin. Each of these rules decisively resolves the case of a tie vote, even
though some of them pay no special attention to ties.
One way to draw a line between them is to consider the purposes
of rule designers. The resulting definition will be somewhat vague, but
it will be sensitive to conscious design choices related to ties. Thus,
"tiebreaker"can refer to a decision rule that is, at least in part,purposely designed to rank options that would otherwise be considered tied-

again, beyond the "tie" that always exists before a decision rule is applied to an unresolved issue. This definition supposes that a metric for
evaluating options has been identified, that a comparison according to
this metric might be inconclusive, and that rule designers have responded to this possibility. As such, the definition tends to distinguish
the first voting rule described above from the other two. A unanimous
consent rule falls outside of this definition, insofar as the rule is chosen for reasons independent of the tie-vote phenomenon." In contrast,
a majority-vote rule might well be chosen partly to deal with tie votes.
When votes are the basic metric of victory, the system's designers must
still decide whether to slant the voting rules toward the status quo,
18 Another way to make the point is to say that, theoretically, every decision rule can be
disaggregated into its applications. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr, As-Applied and FacialChallenges
and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv L Rev 1321, 1334 (2000) ("[S]tatutes often are best understood as encompassing a number of subrules, which frequently are specified only in the process
of statutory application."). Some of these applications will happen to break ties beyond the mere
resolution of uncertainty before application, but this does not mean that the decision rule was
designed to confront the issue of such ties.
19 See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 61-62, 111-14 (Princeton
2000) (observing that unanimity rules prevent coercive redistributive contests while increasing
transaction costs for reaching agreement on even socially beneficial cooperation schemes).
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toward change, toward the vice president, or toward something else.
Demanding majority support for a motion to pass instead of majority
opposition for a motion to fail can reflect an aversion to instability
where motions and countermotions can return to the agenda. And a
purpose-based definition will certainly reach the introduction of a new
variable, such as a coin flip, solely to resolve ties.
But there is reason to prefer a more restrictive definition that
captures only decision rules akin to the coin-flip alternative. That rule
speaks specifically to tie votes. A definition along these lines will isolate a special breed of decision rule that is designed for nothing but
breaking ties. Moreover, the presence of a decision rule that singles
out ties indicates that a prior decision rule could not settle the matter.
When a decision rule breaks down, it effectively identifies a tie for
which a tiebreaker might be needed-a tie beyond that faced by every
decision rule before it is applied to an unresolved issue. As such, a
tiebreaker in the strict sense will come packaged with another rule
that speaks to the same issue but that is lexically superior." In our voting rules example, only the third alternative has this quality: one subrule tells us to compare voting strength, and a second subrule turns to
a coin flip only when voting strength is equal. Such tiebreakers are
part of a decision structure with lexical ordering. Strictly speaking,
then, "tiebreaker" refers to a lexically inferior decision rule that is designed to rank options if and only if a lexically superiordecision rule
fails to rank those same options.

To be clear, the strict definition does not require that the lexically
superior rule be normatively superior as well. This will be true in many
cases but not all. The first letter of a word is not morally superior to
the second letter within the rules for alphabetizing. Furthermore, lexically superior rules can be mere gateways to important variables. A
lexically superior rule might be the preferred basis for merits decisions, while an inferior rule tidies up a small set of close calls; or a lexically superior rule might be a crude screening device, while an inferior
rule includes every variable relevant to a sound decision. Nor does the
definition exclude decision procedures that use the same variable in
both lexically superior and inferior rules. The content or application of
the two rules must differ in some way for ties to be broken,21 but the
same variable might appear in both rules.

20 Lexical (or lexicographical) ordering categorically prioritizes one factor or set of factors
over others. Alphabetizing is the paradigmatic form of lexical ordering: ordering indicated by an
earlier letter in a word always trumps anything suggested by a later letter. See John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 37-38 n 23 (Belknap rev ed 1999).
21 "Do overs," including new trials, are excluded from my definition of a tiebreaker.
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What the strict definition does require is a segmented decision
structure in which a different decision rule takes over when a prior
rule breaks down. This demand is satisfied by soccer shootouts and
candidate coin flips, but not by many of the most well-known decision
rules in law. The strict definition cannot reach interest balancing, multifactor tests, or all-things-considered judgments. Thus, neither the
Hand formula for negligence2 nor the Mathews factors for due
process contain a tiebreaker, only a set of variables that are
processed together. Similarly, a presumption cannot generate a tiebreaker in the strict sense so long as it is mixed with other variables. If
the jury in a criminal trial is instructed to evaluate evidence in light of
a presumption that the defendant is innocent, neither the presumption
nor the evidence of guilt is reserved for tiebreaking purposes.24 Nor do
elements of a crime, a civil claim, or an affirmative defense constitute
tiebreakers. Elements are variables that must point in the same direction for a given side to prevail, meaning that the relevance of any one
no variable is
variable is conditional on the value taken by others, but
21
the
others.
to
compared
in a lexically inferior position
Furthermore, a bifurcated decision structure is not enough. A tiebreaker must attempt to answer the same question addressed by the
lexically superior rule. Either ballot counting or lot drawing may tell
us who wins an election, but a bifurcated capital trial is different. In
that process, a jury is asked to consider the defendant's guilt first and,
if the defendant is found guilty, consider whether to impose the death
penalty. The penalty phase is in no meaningful sense a tiebreaker for
the guilt phase. Rather, the jury is asked to answer two different questions for two distinct purposes. Tiebreakers in the strict sense are conditionally relevant variables that are designed to resolve the same
question addressed by the variables on which they are conditioned.
This restriction is a bit hazy and manipulable, but it helps stop the definition short of all decision rules.

22

See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169,173 (2d Cir 1947) ("[L]iability de-

pends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P.").
23 See Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319,334-35 (1976).
24 See Coffin v United States, 156 US 432, 460 (1895) (treating the presumption of innocence as a piece of evidence in favor of the accused). See also Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 Stan L Rev 873, 879-83 (2000) (translating the presumption of innocence into Bayesian terms as a requirement that jurors begin with an assessment that
the prior odds of guilt are very low).
See, for example, Wiener v Southcoast Childcare Centers, 88 P3d 517, 519 (Cal 2004)
25
(stating that plaintiffs must show duty, breach, and proximate cause to recover for negligence).
For a similar reason, one house of a bicameral legislature is not a tiebreaker for legislation approved by the other house.
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A situation that totters on the edge of the strict definition involves sequencing variables to reduce decision costs. Decisionmakers
sometimes realize that a theoretically relevant variable is especially
difficult or controversial to evaluate and will therefore reserve evaluation of this variable unless it could make a difference. In simple terms,
a decisionmaker would have to be in equipoise or only leaning in one
direction before turning to the costly variable. An example might be
the norm of attempting to avoid resolution of constitutional issues in
adjudication." Such sequencing does produce a bifurcated decision
structure. But it does not include strict lexical ordering, and so it does
not present the same tradeoffs as a tiebreaker strictly defined. If decision-cost sequencing happens to fully bracket some variable until a tie
needs to be broken, the practice satisfies the strict definition. But the
practice falls outside the strict definition if a costly variable may be
added to the mix of relevant variables whenever it might affect the
outcome. The strict definition of a tiebreaker demands that a tie arise
before the tiebreaking decision rule comes into play.
B.

Complications

As with many concepts, mine presents difficulties at the margins.
A few of them are flagged in this section. The first complication is a
risk of underinclusion in the strict definition of a tiebreaker. The others involve the possibility that the presence of a tiebreaker depends
on the observer's frame of reference. My sense is that the first complication is relatively minor and that the others are either manageable or
features rather than bugs.
1. Functional equivalence.
Some decision procedures that include tiebreakers are functionally equivalent to others that do not. To illustrate, compare (1) a majority-vote rule, with (2) a rule that awards victory to the side with
more votes plus a rule that motions fail on a tie vote. Only the second
alternative has the lexical ordering required by the strict definition of
a tiebreaker, yet both alternatives produce the same outcomes in all
cases." If the vote is, say, 50-50, the second decision procedure tells us
26
See, for example, Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis concurring) (asserting that the Court's practice was consistent with this norm). This norm might
also effectively skew the first-order decision rule, as when statutes are interpreted to avoid the risk
of a constitutional problem if reasonably possible. Such skewing is akin to increasing the vote requirement for approval of legislation; it does not entail a tiebreaking decision structure.
27 I am assuming the same quorum rule for both alternatives and that the denominator for
the majority-vote rule is the number of people actually voting.
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that the motion fails by resort to a tiebreaker in the strict sense, while
the first decision procedure tells us the same thing because the motion
failed to achieve a majority vote." And both are probably driven by
the same purposes. It seems as if the two alternatives should be
treated as one.
The functional equivalence problem is real but, in the end, not
large. In some cases, the purpose-based definition of a tiebreaker will
capture a functionally equivalent decision procedure. Majority-vote
rules are candidates for this looser definition. More important, the
functional equivalence problem is confined by practical considerations. It is most problematic when decisionmakers use a simple scoring
system that cleanly reduces all variables to one metric, such as group
voting, but this does not exhaust the phenomenon of indeterminacy.
When more subjective judgments must be made, such as the persuasiveness of competing normative arguments, indeterminacy problems
can be present regardless of how convincing one side must be to prevail. In these situations, it is not clear how adjusting the decision rule
could mimic a lexically inferior tiebreaker. If the tiebreaker would be
"defendant wins in cases of indeterminacy," we cannot exactly match
those results by incremental increases in the plaintiff's burden of persuasion. The possibility of indeterminacy will reappear at each level."
More generally, the content of many tiebreakers cannot be mimicked without a bifurcated decision structure. For tiebreakers that introduce new variables, such as flipping coins to resolve tie elections,
there will not be a plausible functional equivalent. No one will argue
for adding a randomly determined vote for one side or another in
every election, and doing so would still fail to provide functional equivalence. The results would not be the same in every possible case.
Adding a random vote to every candidate election instead of reserving it for tiebreaking purposes can cause tie votes, and then leave them
unbroken. The same is true for making the vice president a full voting
member of the Senate, rather than restricting his voting right to the case
of a tie. As a full voting member, the vice president might create ties
when an odd number of senators vote. The real differences between
28
See Robert, et al, Robert's Rules at 392 (cited in note 4). The same observation can be
made for baseball. It is sometimes said that a "tie goes to the runner" at first base, but the applicable
rule states that a batter is out if "he or first base is tagged before he touches first base." Official
Baseball Rules 6.05(j) (2008), online at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2008/officialrules/
06_thebatter.pdf (visited Apr 24, 2010) (emphasis added). Even if ties at first base are possible,
this rule purports to offer a decisive resolution without a separate tiebreaker.
29 Requiring the plaintiff to prove his case to an absolute certainty, however, does seem to
mimic the comparable tiebreaking decision structure-that is,plaintiff must be certainly correct,
which will never or rarely occur, plus plaintiff loses if the decisionmaker is uncertain whether
plaintiff is certainly correct. The results should be the same in all cases.
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tiebreaking and other decision structures are a principal concern of
this Article.
2. Framing the decision.
The strict definition of a tiebreaker requires lexically ordered
rules that address the same decision. These conditions were imposed
to prevent the definition from covering every bifurcated or sequential
decision structure. But there is no orthodox way to identify the relevant "decision," so tiebreakers may disappear and reappear depending
on how an observer frames the decision in question.
Although the requirement of lexical ordering will stop the uninhibited proliferation of perceived tiebreakers, many rules that look
like tiebreakers from one perspective can be eliminated by shrinking
the frame to excise any lexically superior decision rule. Isolating the
task of evaluating a single variable ignores the connection that variable might have to any other. Radically small frames might be oddly
small minded, but there is a related complication. Candidates for tiebreaker status might be recharacterized as discrete rules applicable to
particular situations -as, in a sense, all rules are.
Take the yield-right rule for intersections. Traffic laws usually
provide that, when two vehicles "approach or enter an intersection
from different roadways at approximately the same time, the driver of
the vehicle on the left must yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the
right.""o Yield right can be counted as a tiebreaker for a rule that the
first driver to enter an intersection may proceed if safe to do so." That
is, a yield-right rule takes over when a first-in-time rule breaks down.
But one might instead say that there is one traffic rule for hotly contested intersections and a separate rule for others." (One might even
claim that the first-in-time rule takes over when the yield-right rule
breaks down, although that perspective preserves lexical ordering.)
Framing decisions might be more art than science, but it is not so
problematic that an investigation into tiebreakers is fruitless. The significance of such framing is hardly confined to tiebreakers," and it
Ill Ann Stat ch 625, § 5/11-901(a) (Smith Hurd).
See Rupp v Keebler, 175 Ill App 619, 620 (1912) (stating the first-to-enter rule). See also
Lauman v Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc, 681 NE2d 1055, 1063-64 (Ill App 1997) (indicating that stopsign intersections may be governed by both rules).
32 See Edward C. Fisher and Robert H. Reeder, Vehicle Traffic Law 154-55 (Traffic Institute, Northwestern 1974) (placing the yield-right rule into a category of right-of-way rules that
deal with collision risks). Consider Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw: Principlesand Policies 671-74 (Aspen 3d ed 2006) (summarizing the tiers of scrutiny in which different state classifications trigger different burdens for defending them).
33 See, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Nonretroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1758-64 (1991) (discussing when
30

31
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does not appear that people are incapacitated by the possibilities for
reframing what seems like the relevant decision. Indeed a subdiscipline of decision analysis is devoted to identifying discrete decision
nodes within the same decision tree and, at least incidentally, distinguishing different decision trees." In any event, some decision structures are so plainly designed for the same problem that the presence
of a tiebreaker will be uncontroversial. That the yield-right rule might
be challenging for some observers to categorize should not explode
the categories entirely. There should be consensus that lotteries have
been used as tiebreakers to resolve candidate elections after a tolerable amount of ballot counting fails to do so. And there should be consensus that the penalty phase of a capital trial is not a tiebreaker for
the guilt phase.
Even when there is not general agreement on an example, the
analysis that follows can be useful. If an individual is willing to consider more than one variable within a frame and is personally satisfied
with the coherence of grouping two lexically ordered decision rules
together, the analysis may proceed along the lines suggested below. In
addition, the ability to accept large frames of reference permits critical
evaluation of more decision structures. The closing pages of this Article exploit the possibility of large frames so as to evaluate all of law
or all of adjudication as a single unit resembling a tiebreaker. I hope
to show that this strikingly large frame is, if nothing else, provocative.
II. DESIGNING TIEBREAKERS

The foregoing discussion raises several questions. First, why
would someone design a decision procedure with a tiebreaker in the
strict sense? Every variable thought relevant to the merits of a decision can be grouped into a single stage of evaluation, instead of stowing a variable in a tiebreaker position. Second, if a tiebreaking decision structure is justified and can be implemented, what should the
tiebreaker look like? It must be that some tiebreakers are better than
others. This Part develops answers.

a judicial decision might qualify as new law rather than another part of the old); Daryl J.Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311, 1313-18 (2002) (discussing
potentially determinative framing issues in constitutional adjudication); Daniel Lowenstein,
Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, I Election L J 35, 46-48 (2002) (contending that a
unitary subject is a contestable matter of convenience and social context).
3
See Detlof von Winterfeldt and Ward Edwards, Defining a Decision Analytic Structure,
in Ward Edwards, Ralph F Miles, Jr, and Detlof von Winterfeldt, eds, Advances in Decision
Analysis: From Foundations to Applications 81, 94-96, 102 (Cambridge 2007) (explaining that "a

decision tree is not meant to be a complete and exhaustive representation of all future decisions
and events").
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A. Justifying Tiebreaking Structures
Several justifications for a tiebreaking decision structure are discussed below. Some of these arguments do not depend on a view that
ties are problematic per se, and some might be unpersuasive in any
event. Ultimately, I concentrate on plausible justifications that are in
fact related to the conclusion that ties must be minimized or eliminated.
1. Overloaded systems.
It turns out that the strict definition of a tiebreaker reaches not
only systems that experience episodic stalemates-such as candidate
elections and soccer matches-but also perpetually overloaded systems where tiebreakers are constantly in use. In the latter case, decisionmakers are so swamped with options that their ability to evaluate
each one thoroughly is overwhelmed. These onslaughts call for a decision procedure that will take a first cut at the available choices and
whittle them down to a manageable set for more careful review. Here
the motivation for a tiebreaking decision structure is not exactly the
fear that a decision rule will run out, but rather that the system will be
unable to make any sound decisions at all.
In the early 1980s, for instance, the City of Minneapolis received
more than two thousand valid applications for only twenty firefighter
positions." Lacking the resources to evaluate each application thoroughly, city officials randomly selected a subset of eight hundred applicants for further competitive testing." Medical screening employs an
analogous decision structure. Health professionals sometimes use an
inexpensive screening test to determine which patients are relatively
more likely to have an illness, and then use a more costly and more accurate test to ferret out the false positives within the smaller sample."
We can understand the stages of civil litigation in similar fashion. Civil
actions that cannot be resolved by negotiation and motions to dismiss
are subject to more costly evaluative efforts, such as summary judgment after discovery or, once in a while, full-blown trial." One might
think that, during these stages of litigation, the decision rule is not
See Anderson v City of Minneapolis,363 NW2d 886,887 (Minn App 1985).
See id at 887, 890 (upholding the scheme).
37 See, for example, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Tuberculosis:
Tests and Diagnosis (Jan 28, 2009), online at http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/tuberculosis/
ds00372/dsection=tests-and-diagnosis (visited Apr 24, 2010) (discussing skin tests, blood tests,
chest x-rays, gene tests, and so forth).
38 See FRCP 12(b)(6),12(c), 56 (authorizing dispositive pretrial motions). See also 28 USC
§ 1914 (imposing filing fees for federal civil actions); Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in
First Amendment Law, 98 Nw U L Rev 1291, 1324, 1333-34 (2004) (describing doctrine that
filters out some claims and triggers further evaluation for others).
35

36
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truly changing insofar as the substantive law remains stable. But that
view is superficial. More rigorous testing for only those judgments that
seem most difficult is a familiar strategy for economizing on decision
costs, and it is notoriously tricky to distinguish the effects of changing
"procedural" as opposed to "substantive" decision rules."
A tiebreaking decision structure does emerge when an economical screening device is joined with a more thorough back-end evaluation on the merits. There is lexical ordering, and both decision rules
seem to address the same issue (hiring firefighters, for example, or
determining whether the defendant owes the plaintiff). But in these
situations, the tiebreaking stages of the decision structure are the main
events, normatively speaking. The hiring example involves screening
with a random variable, which has no moral relevance to the issue. If
decisionmakers enjoyed unlimited resources, such screening rules
would probably fall away, and what was heretofore a tiebreaker would
become the only decision rule. The tiebreaking decision structure is
motivated by decision-cost constraints.
Screening devices for overloaded systems are worth treating separately from tiebreakers that cure episodic stalemate. The system
overload scenario might be less controversial, in that a tiebreaking
decision structure is more likely necessary to avoid system crashes. If
an existing decision rule rarely produces ties, there is probably greater
opportunity to eliminate them without adding a lexically inferior decision rule. More importantly, the tradeoffs will be different. With overloaded systems, the design question is which options to screen out given that excluded options cannot be reconsidered at the tiebreaking
stage. With episodic stalemates, the design question is which variable
should be used to break ties among plausible options, given a prior
robust effort to rank on the merits. Overloaded systems are meaningfully different, and they are not the focus of this Article."o
I do not want to overstate the differences. In both situations, decisionmakers must select rules that move the system toward decision

39
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 S Ct Rev
85, 112-13 ("Procedural rules usually are just a measure of how much the substantive entitlements are worth, of what we are willing to sacrifice to see a given goal attained."); Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property, 1975 S Ct Rev 261, 267-73 (indicating a similar reaction from a
different normative perspective).
4
The overloaded system category could be excluded from the definition of a tiebreaker
by requiring that the lexically superior decision rule have some probability of resolving the
decision problem on its own. Aside from specification difficulties, this exclusion would mean that
the existence of a tiebreaker would depend on the composition of cases facing the decisionmaker at any particular moment. Although it is not possible to ignore entirely the composition of
cases in evaluating the propriety of tiebreakers, I want to avoid complicating the definition of a
tiebreaker with this consideration.
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without unduly jeopardizing the chance of a sound decision on the
merits. Whether the system is in crisis "at the front end" because too
many options are on the table, or "at the back end" because a leftover
subset of options seems indistinguishable, responsible decisionmakers
will address these possibilities. They will choose variables for one stage
of the decision procedure with a concern that errors might increase
during the other stage. The considerations discussed below are often
applicable to both overloaded systems and episodic stalemates, and to
situations in between.41
2. Morally inferior variables.
Another potential justification for a tiebreaking decision structure results from moral reasoning and hierarchical value sets. Truly
fundamental values may take strong priority over others -so much so
that no amount of gain or loss measured on the inferior value set
could possibly alter a conclusion reached using the superior value set.
If anything within the superior value set points toward one option
over others, the decision is made. Note that neither incommensurability nor incomparability is sufficient to create this rigid hierarchy
of values. Those concepts indicate difficulties in trading gains on one
metric with losses on another, but they do not indicate that any value
is categorically less important than others.42 To achieve a lexical value
41 One might think that a tiebreaking decision structure can be justified by the desirability
of decision-cost sequencing alone. As discussed above, it can be sensible to postpone the evaluation of costly or controversial variables until they become necessary to reach a sound decision.
See text accompanying note 26. But decision-cost sequencing is often accomplished without
creating a tiebreaker in the strict sense. The costly or controversial variable would have to be
segregated from the other variables and considered only when those variables are inconclusiveand not when those variables lean toward one option over another, however slightly. For that
lexical ordering to happen, an influence in addition to decision costs is probably at work-such
as system overload, moral inferiority, or the imperative of breaking ties. The logic of decisioncost sequencing might help identify variables that make good tiebreakers, but it does not justify a
tiebreaking decision structure.
Similar comments apply to variables that are peculiarly subject to cognitively biased evaluation. See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:Heuristics
and Biases, in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty 3, 4-18 (cited in
note 16). Such variables might be excluded from consideration in ordinary circumstances without
making them tiebreakers. In addition, justifying a tiebreaking decision structure based on the
risk of cognitive bias might incorporate a self-defeating assumption. If a decisionmaker will
sometimes handle a particular variable poorly, there is reason to suspect that the decisionmaker
will sometimes not respect the dictates of a tiebreaking decision structure. I note this concern in
the discussion of interpretive method, see Part III.B.2, but I ordinarily-sometimes generouslyassume that decisionmakers can follow instructions.
42
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779,796,
798 (1994) (explaining that incommensurability, in a relatively weak sense, "occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized"); Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability:
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ordering, one or more values must be drastically demoted into a fully
inferior status.
Utilitarian purists might not accept that any two relevant values
can, will, or should be lexically ordered,4 but the idea has taken hold
elsewhere. The most famous example is probably John Rawls's theory
of justice. Rawls described (1) a set of equal basic liberties, such as
freedom of thought, which takes priority over (2) a principle that social and economic inequalities must be attached to positions that are
available under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, which in
turn takes priority over (3) a principle that such inequalities should
afford the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged person"-in other
words, that systems can be ranked according to how they treat the
very least well-off person." Evaluative frameworks such as this have a
tiebreaking structure insofar as lower priority grounds for judging
systems come into play only if higher priority grounds are satisfied.
And this structure comes about because of reflective moral reasoning,
not because of any aversion to ties per se.
Now, Rawlsian justice is not a perfect example of a tiebreaking
decision structure. The former establishes goals for justice-seeking
societies, while the latter is a mechanism for avoiding stalemates within society. A proponent of Rawlsian justice would want a system, indeed all systems, to run the gauntlet of every priority listed above and
to satisfy every principle therein. Reaching the tiebreaking stage of a
decision structure, on the other hand, is commonly associated with a
sense of regret and a fear of calamity. Tiebreakers are often safeguards
in a way that lower priority principles in a Rawlsian scheme are not.
And when a tiebreaking decision structure is used to prevent system
A Response to ProfessorSchauer, 45 Hastings L J 813, 815-16 (1994) (distinguishing the dilemmas posed by strong incommensurability from ordering by lexical priorities). On different specifications for the term, see, for example, Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 146 U Pa L Rev 1371, 1383-89 (1998) (offering various definitions and reasons); Henry
S. Mather, Law-Making and Incommensurability, 47 McGill L J 345, 348-58 (2002) (defining
incommensurability for lawmakers and for others).
43 But see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 11-16 (Chicago 1906) (originally published
1863) (asserting that certain higher pleasures can safely be judged superior in kind by those
with experience).
44 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:A Restatement 42-47, 59-61 (Belknap 2001) (Erin
Kelly, ed). Rawls also suggested that a principle of meeting "basic needs" might be lexically prior
to all three of these principles. See id at 44 n 7.
45
See id at 59-60. A moderated version of Rawls's third (maximin) principle is leximin,
which allows comparison of the next-least well-off person if two options yield the same treatment of the very least well-off person. See Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement24-25
(MIT 1982). For other versions of "prioritarianism" that incorporate some value for equality
among people, including a weak version where greater equality is merely a tiebreaker, see Bertil
'Angodden, The Value of Equality, 19 Econ & Phil 1, 23-32 & table 2 (2003). For a sophisticated
review of prioritarian social welfare functions and competitors, see Matthew D. Adler, WellBeing and Equity:A Frameworkfor Policy Analysis *ch 4 (Oxford forthcoming 2011).
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overload, it has even less in common with the logic of hierarchical values. Then tiebreakers are simply ensuring that decisions can be made.
Nevertheless, Rawlsian justice illustrates that sophisticated moral reasoning can result in a conclusion that some values are categorically
more important than others. This conclusion can be the justification
for creating what qualifies as a tiebreaking decision structure, even if
Rawlsian justice does not quite have a tiebreaking character.
Although lexical moral inferiority is a relatively extreme judgment, it is a phenomenon. A recent example (to which I will return)
involves student assignment. The City of Seattle guaranteed that siblings could be sent to the same high school before factors such as racial composition and geographic proximity were considered.4 As an
extreme moral judgment, lexical inferiority is subject to testing with
extreme hypotheticals. To be lexically inferior, the consideration must
have zero power to influence a result when a lexically superior consideration points the other way, however slightly. Hence, if a university
claims that no student should be admitted unless the applicant is highly likely to graduate, this must be true even when the applicant offers
to donate $100 million to the university and there is a 50-50 chance
that the applicant will graduate.
The larger problem with rigorous exploration of this justification
for tiebreakers is viewpoint diversity. Whether one consideration is
lexically inferior to a second consideration will depend on the decisionmaker's normative framework. Many frameworks existcosmopolitan, libertarian, utilitarian, and so on-along with disagreement over the proper application of general frameworks to particular
problems. Competing frameworks and contested applications multiply
the number of potential tiebreakers. This makes difficult a firm judgment on any single tiebreaker without narrowing the analysis to one
moral perspective, and it makes impossible a firm judgment on many
tiebreakers at once without excessive length. My response is to show
how moral reasoning fits into a general analytic approach to the evaluation of tiebreakers, without attempting to settle the specific moral
judgments that must be made within that analysis. In this way, the
analysis will remain relevant to people with a variety of moral commitments, at the price of simple conclusions to narrow issues.
Before leaving moral reasoning, we can learn something by comparing Rawlsian justice theories to decision theory literature regarding uncertainty. Decision theorists attempting to maximize expected
46
See text accompanying note 102. Consider Norwest Bank Worthington v Ahlers, 485 US
197, 202 (1988) (describing the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy, under which unsecured
creditors may object to a reorganization plan that does not make them whole before a junior
class receives property).
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utility have recognized special problems in rank ordering possible actions when, for example, probabilities cannot rationally be assigned to
possible states of the world." Various strategies have been suggested
with nifty labels and more or less intuitive foundations: maximin, maximax, minimax regret, the Hurwitz a-criterion, and so on." These strategies could be thought of as tiebreakers, insofar as they resolve indeterminacy and come into play when ordinary rules of decision cannot
solve the problem." Although it may well be better to think of decision theorists as building two different strategies for two different
problems (risk versus uncertainty), the separate strategies considered
together vaguely resemble the lexically ranked priorities of philosophers like Rawls.
There is another way to distinguish decision theory, however. The
goods that Rawls prioritizes do not seem to reappear in other parts of
the ordering. Free thought might be necessary to make lower-ranked
goods valuable, but that is not to say that free thought is part of the
criteria at those lower ranks. In some contrast, the values that animate
strategies for uncertainty, such as minimax regret -perhaps the special
pain of regret when a decisionmaker learns that he could have chosen
a better action-probably can be incorporated into expected utility
analysis when there is only risk. I know of nothing in decision theory
that prohibits the use of regret to estimate the utility associated with
different outcomes in different states of the world. These strategies
might then allow for a kind of "double counting": the decisionmaker
might take account of a value such as regret aversion in every decision
situation where regret is possible and then, if uncertainty becomes a
problem, reintroduce that value to help rank one course of action over
another. Regardless of the present state of decision theory, the possibility of double counting variables turns out to be important, and I
address it later in this Article.
3. Politics and strategic behavior.
The discussion above emphasized moral principle. But decision
rules can be the product of politics, negotiation, compromise, and further dynamic interaction among people with very different goals.
47 Literally speaking, probabilities always can be assigned. The question is whether some
assigned probabilities are basically worthless.
48 See French, Decision Theory at ch 2 (cited in note 9). Here "maximin" simply refers to the
action with the highest lowest utility, rather than the well-being of the least-advantaged person.
49 See Isaac Levi, Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict 110-11
(Cambridge 1986) (relating decision rules for situations of uncertainty to lexicographical decision structures).
50
See Part II.B.2.
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These dynamics can yield a tiebreaking decision structure. That is,
people with different interests might settle on a decision procedure
that demotes certain variables to a lexically inferior position, perhaps
while fine tuning the lexically superior rule to ensure that "ties" will
happen with some probability. This is partly an explanation for tiebreakers and partly a justification, insofar as this kind of negotiation
and compromise is socially beneficial.
An example of political interaction creating tiebreakers appears
at the Founding, when US House delegations were given the task of
selecting the President if no single candidate received an outright majority of electoral votes." House participation was expected to happen
frequently enough that the Electoral College would tend to function
as a screening device rather than the decisive stage of an election.52 A
compromise explanation also helps account for affirmative action
programs that are designed as tiebreakers rather than part of a unitary, all-things-considered judgment." Securitized debt instruments
can be portrayed in similar fashion, to the extent that different
tranches are created with different risks and investors decide whether
and where to buy in." If things go badly, the stakes of those who
bought into less-favorable tranches are tapped out before those in
other tranches take losses. In any case, the general idea is that counterintuitive decision procedures are sometimes best explained and
even justified by interactive politics rather than abstract principle.
This leads to an observation about incentives and strategic behavior. Tiebreakers are effective only when they differ from the lexically
superior decision rule, and the difference might matter to interested
parties. Knowing that the basis for decision will shift if the tiebreaker is
used, some people might be relieved to reach the tiebreaking stage
while others might seek to avoid it at all costs. Creating a tiebreaking
decision structure therefore opens another possibility for strategic behavior, by parties and by decisionmakers. Thus one political party will
not mind if the Senate deadlocks and the vice president decides the
matter, while another will work harder to attract the fifty-first vote; and
one admissions officer might be satisfied with a large set of ties that
allow consideration of applicant income or race, while another might
look harder for distinguishing features relevant to the first cut.

See US Const Art II, § 1, cl 3.
See Jack N. Rakove, OriginalMeanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 264-65 (Knopf 1996).
53 See Part III.A.2.
54 See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance
of PredatoryLending, 75 Fordham L Rev 2039,2045-46 (2007).
51
52
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Whether such adjustments are troublesome depends on a given
normative perspective. Perhaps competing pressures to avoid or
prompt a tiebreaker are unimportant, acceptable, or even useful. In
any case, it is difficult to offer a global evaluation of the strategic opportunities generated by tiebreakers. More specific information is
needed. For instance, if the lexically superior decision rule is a variable
such as age or race, participants might not be able to manipulate the
process into the tiebreaking stage. The important observation is that a
tiebreaking decision structure, like any decision procedure, should be
evaluated considering the likely reaction of interested parties. The
special point about tiebreakers is that they may create unique strategic opportunities and behavioral incentives.
4. Intolerable ties.
This brings us to justifications that depend on the threat of a tie,
which will be the focus of the remainder of the Article. But the first
thing to remember here is that a tie might be tolerable. In fact, ties are
sometimes required by law or moral theory.
Part of equal protection doctrine instructs officials to "treat like
cases alike."" Although this command is fairly vacuous, the objective is
to ensure that certain classes are treated the same as other classes
with respect to certain features. Functionally, this means that all remain tied with respect to these features. In Reed v Reed," to take one
example, the Supreme Court invalidated the use of sex as a tiebreaker
in appointing the administrator of an estate." There might be other
ways to distinguish applicant qualifications, but fathers and mothers
had to remain "equally entitled"" absent further inquiry. Perhaps the
most prominent legal equality norm is the one-person, one-vote principle for legislative districting." At one point, the Supreme Court went
so far as to claim that "[t]he conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing-one person, one vote."a

55 See, for example, Engquist v Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 US 591, 601-02
(2008); Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793,799 (1997).
56 404 US 71 (1971).
57 Id at 76-77.
58
Id at 73.
59 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 568-77 (1964) (requiring legislative districts to have
"as nearly ... equal population as is practicable"). See also US Const Art 1, § 3, cl 2 (instructing
that senators "be divided as equally as may be into three Classes" for election).
60 Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368, 381 (1963). Of course, the Court's assertion fails to explain
the composition of the United States Senate. See US Const Art I, § 3, cl 2; US Const Art V.
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And it is commonplace to tolerate parity in our social lives. Some
people like apples and oranges equally well, some people are agnostic
about the existence of a divine being, and some people try to treat each
of their children equally well. Many people believe that every person is
entitled to a certain kind of dignity and respect from others." Nothing in
these conclusions screams "error" and an urgent need for correction or
precaution. To the extent that a tie is a form of indeterminacy, only the
most pathologically curious among us find it impossible to rest with the
answer "I don't know" or "It's not clear." The compulsion to rank order
is hardly a weaker sign of mental illness than the embrace of equality or
uncertainty. Even US News & World Report, which reflects widespread
craving for differentiation along a unitary numerical measure of quality,
tolerates ties when it ranks schools.62
Furthermore, life does not always present all-or-nothing choices.
Even when we face problems of scarcity-where not everyone's justified claim to a resource can be satisfied-there often will be alternatives to ranking recipients and leaving some people out in the cold.
Sometimes the resource in question can be split between deserving
claimants without too much sacrifice in value. This is true of money. If
instead the resource is indivisible," there are other ways to share instead of rank. Occasionally a resource can be used effectively by more
than one person at the same time. This is sometimes true of real property. When this is not sensible, people might take turns using the resource, thereby sharing across time. There is even the possibility of
denying the resource to equally entitled claimants." And it should be
remembered that some scarcity problems can be solved by producing
more of the resource. Finally, there are well-known benefits to delay.
Indecision creates an opportunity to collect more information and
respond to unforeseen circumstances. The obvious conclusion is that

61 See, for example, Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals pt 2, §§ 37-39 at 209
(Cambridge 1996) (Mary Gregor, trans and ed) (positing a duty to respect others and a correlative claim to respect); Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art 1, 22, UN General Assembly
Res No 217A(III) (1948), UN Doc A/810 (declaring that "[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights" and are "entitled to ... rights indispensable for [their] dignity"). See
also Mill, Utilitarianismat 93 (cited in note 43) (formulating Jeremy Bentham's view as "everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one").
62
See Best Colleges 2010, US News & World Rep, online at http://colleges.usnews.rankings
andreviews.com/best-colleges/national-universities-rankings (visited Apr 24, 2010) (ranking the
California Institute of Technology, MIT, Stanford, and the University of Pennsylvania fourth).
63
I mean either literal or practical indivisibility. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in
Adjudication,51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1, 20 (2009).
6
On a related note, the Order of the Coif used to allow its chapters to deny membership
to law students who tied for the last of a limited number of places. See Constitution of the Order
of the Coif § 4.2(b)(2) (1998).
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there is no need to rank options when sustained equality is permitted,
useful, or required.
That said, ties certainly can be troublesome or even catastrophic.
The risks of ties prompt warnings of stalemate, standoff, impasse, or
deadlock. People will differ over which ties are disastrous and which
are endurable, but there is no question that individuals and societies
are at least occasionally justified in making extraordinary efforts to
rank options. The inability to select one home, one job, one patient,
one President, one plan of attack, or even one driver with the right of
way can be more than a nuisance. It can be the difference between
systems seizing up and rumbling forward. Indeed, ties might be terrible even when unlikely. If the potential injury from stalemate is sufficiently catastrophic, even minuscule chances of a tie might be addressed with extremely costly precautions.
As one remarkable illustration of the felt importance of breaking
ties, consider legislative redistricting in Illinois. The one-person, onevote principle triggers redistricting obligations every ten years when
new census figures arrive. But in the early 1960s, Illinois politicians
deadlocked over a new redistricting plan for the state house. As a consequence, 236 candidates for 177 seats ended up all running together
in a single at-large race." The ballots were enormously long. Subsequently, a new multi-tier tiebreaking system was established for redistricting purposes.6 If the state legislature fails to complete a redistricting plan by a certain deadline, a bipartisan eight-member commission
inherits the obligation. If this commission deadlocks as well-which is
not unlikely given its composition6-then lots are drawn to determine
whether a Republican or Democrat is added to the commission.M The

65
See James H. Andrews, Illinois' At-Large Vote, 55 Natl Civic Rev 253, 253-54 (1966)
(explaining that an at-large election was prescribed by a 1954 state constitutional amendment).
66 See Ill Const Art 4, § 3(b).
See John S. Jackson and Lourenke Prozesky, Redistricting in Illinois 9-11 (Paul Simon
67
Public Policy Institute, Apr 2005), online at http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article
=1013&context=ppi-papers (visited Apr 24, 2010) (noting deadlocks in each of the last three
redistricting cycles).
68 See Winters v Illinois State Board of Elections, 197 F Supp 2d 1110, 1115 (ND Ill 2001)
(three judge panel) (upholding the tiebreaker against due process and equal protection challenges), affd without opinion, 535 US 967 (2002). Proponents of this tiebreaking system might
have thought that the prospect of a lottery would frighten legislatures into reaching agreement.
This amounts to a "penalty default" tiebreaker, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 91-94 (1989),
which is intended to encourage constructive behavior during the prior stage of decisionmaking.
The attempt has not been successful in Illinois redistricting, but the strategy may be viable elsewhere. Difficulties include finding a tiebreaker that is sufficiently unpleasant to affect behavior,
yet not so awful that the threatened tiebreaker could not credibly be threatened. In any event,
seeing decisionmakers resort to tiebreakers informs the rest of us that prior decision rules are
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redistricting issue illustrates how the prospect of deadlock may instigate repeated efforts to guarantee resolution and to improve the quality of the tiebreaking device.
B.

When Ties Are Intolerable

Suppose, then, that a tie is costly or problematic. What is the best
response in terms of decision rules and decision structures? This Part
first highlights design choices that can minimize ties without generating tiebreaking decision structures, then explains the advantages and
disadvantages associated with using tiebreakers, strictly defined.
1. Preventing ties.
If a persistent tie would be harmful, there are strategies for responding to the risk aside from the creation of tiebreakers. The basic
lesson here is that the risk of a tie is a function of the decision rule
operating in a given context, and that there are several ways in which
decision procedures can be adjusted to prevent ties.
One possibility was mentioned above in a discussion of voting
rules: manipulating a unitary decision rule by raising the bar for one
outcome over another.6 That is, the preferred outcome can be predetermined for numerical ties according to some value choice. As I have
explained, this move will not eliminate indeterminacy regarding whether the new bar has been satisfied, but it can eliminate one form of tie.
Another possibility is to make a unitary decision rule more sensitive. Greater effort to detect differences or better evaluative technology can reduce the number of perceived ties. Hence a decisionmaker
might spend more time on the problem to gather information and to
reconsider carefully the options, or invest in better tools for processing
relevant information in ways that allow clearer distinctions between
options. These efforts can reveal more gradations within relevant metrics and can yield greater confidence in these perceptions. This should
reduce the probability of a tie. Thus radar guns supply a more accurate
measure of motorist speeds than unassisted human sensory perception; and we hope that recounting ballots in candidate elections has a
similar upside.
A related strategy is to make the decision rule more complex. If it
has not already been done, the scales for relevant variables could be
increased or new variables could be added. Assuming that every gradation in the scale is equally likely to be perceived, and that variables can
failing to resolve issues. This might be good reason to stop and reexamine the design of those
prior rules.
69 See Part I.B. 1.
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be measured with adequate confidence, the chance of a tie plummets
when we move from a variable with a few gradations to hundreds or
thousands of gradations. Adding new variables has a similar effect. It
tends to reduce the chance of a tie, all else equal."o Moreover, adding
variables might be justified regardless of how threatening a tie would
be. Every new variable that is relevant to a sound decision should increase the likelihood of a correct decision, taking into account the possibility that complex decision procedures tend to induce mistakes."
The reduction in ties from additional variables can be estimated.
Suppose you face two options: reading the rest of this Article (action A) or writing an article of your own (action B). Suppose further
that you use two variables to resolve this type of decision problem:
entertainment value (variable a) and educational value (variable b).
Each variable is equally important to you and can take one of two
values: favor action A (represented by the value -1) or favor action B
(represented by the value +1).n Assume that each value is equally

likely for each variable in such decisions before you begin thinking
about your options.' Finally, variables a and b are commensurable;
you will simply add them together to make the decision. On these assumptions, the probability of a tie is 50 percent. There are four permutations and two of them add up to zero, as shown in Table 1. A zero
sum amounts to a tie between A and B.

70 One factor that must remain unaffected is the distribution of hard cases. If for some
reason the addition of another variable leads people to litigate hard cases more often, for example, then the percent chance of a tie might actually increase. Having no strong intuition about the
effect on contested cases, I will assume no net effect.
71 See, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 Stan L Rev 211, 214 (1995).
72 These relative values make it easy to see the direction in which each variable points in
two-option cases. A more common scoring method assigns a zero or positive value 10, 1,2,... n)

to each variable for each option (for example, A. = 1, Ab = 2, B, = 3, B, = 2, C, = 2, C, = 0), and

then compares the total scores for each option (for example, A = 3, B = 5, C = 2).
73 The convention in decision theory differs. Ordinarily, decision theorists construct their
decision tables to show that the expected utility of different options depends partly on the state
of the world after a decision is made, and that the possible states are beyond the decisionmaker's
control. Hence, decision tables chart the consequences of a set of actions across a set of states,
which may or may not be subject to reliable prediction. See, for example, French, Decision
Theory at 33 (cited in note 9). In my simplified discussion, the exact consequences of action A
and action B are known to the decisionmaker once values are assigned to the variables, and it is
known that each variable is equally likely to take the value -1 or +1.
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TABLE 1. PERMUTATIONS FOR 2 VARIABLES WITH 2 VALUES

a

b

a+b

choice

-1
+1
-1
+1

-1
-1
+1
+1

-2
0
0
+2

A
tie
tie
B

{-1, +11

Now suppose that you are willing to add a third variable to the
mix, such as reputation (variable c). If c has the same characteristics as
a and b, then the possibility of a tie is totally eliminated. All three variables can never add up to zero, given the restrictions on their values.
The eight permutations are shown in Table 2.
TABLE

2. PERMUTATIONS FOR 3 VARIABLES WITH 2 VALUES f-1, +11
a

b

c

a+b +c

choice

-1
+1
-1
+1
-1
+1
-1
+1

-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
-1
+1
+1

-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1

-3
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
+3

A
A
A
B
A
B
B
B

These two-value cases do not reflect most real-life decision problems. Many variables are much less rigid. One variable might be more
important than others, or might clearly favor one action over another
rather than simply point in one direction. As a corrective, one or more
variables can be loosened to take values higher than +1 or lower than
-1. It is also possible for a variable to be indeterminate. A decisionmaker might be unable to distinguish two actions with respect to educational value, or entertainment value, or some other relevant feature.
This possibility suggests that at least some variables should be adjusted so that they may take the value 0.
The two-value variable cases lack these nuances. Because of this,
an odd pattern emerges for the chance of a tie when new variables are
added (Figure 1). The chance of a tie is always nil with an odd number
of variables taking the values (-1, +1). In contrast, an even number of

1688

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:1661

such variables results in a diminishing number of ties, with the percent
chance topping out at 50 percent in the two-variable case.
FIGURE 1. TIES WITH 2-VALUE VARIABLES
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FIGURE 2. TIES WITH 3-VALUE VARIABLES 1-, 0, +11
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FIGURE 3. TIES WITH 5-VALUE VARIABLES
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The second pattern is the one worth stressing: the percentage of
ties tends to decrease as the number of variables increases. It holds for
more nuanced variables. For variables taking the values [-1, 0, +11, the
chance of a tie stays at 33 percent for one or two variables and then
drops to about 26 percent for three variables and 18 percent for seven
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variables (Figure 2). The pattern is similar for variables taking the values -2, -1, 0, +1, +21. The major difference is that the chance of a tie is
uniformly lower, starting at 20 percent and falling to about 10 percent
with seven variables in play (Figure 3)."

2. Breaking ties.
The results above reflect a general principle that additional gradations or variables tend to reduce the risk of a tie. If a tie would be
problematic, the best response might be a unitary decision rule that
incorporates every conceivably relevant variable and a decision procedure that measures each variable with precision. But there are limits
to the foregoing strategy. Decision costs likely will rise as the decision
rule encompasses more variables and the process becomes more sensitive to nuance. In addition, the number of variables truly relevant to a
sound decision has a ceiling. At some point, rational decisionmakers
will run out of them. Moreover, the ceiling on useful variables might
be lower if we account for the limited cognitive capacity of human
beings. Complex formulas will be beyond the ability of many people
to operate, at least without making frequent and serious errors. And,
in at least some situations, a tie will remain possible even if all relevant variables are measured without error.
For these reasons, it will sometimes make sense to create a tiebreaking decision structure to break intolerable ties. So, assuming that
this structure can be implemented such that decisionmakers will abide
by it, what makes a good tiebreaker? Three candidates are assessed
below: random, relevant, and double-counted variables.
a) Randomization. Aside from morally inferior variables, and as
a purely theoretical matter, there is an especially attractive type of
tiebreaker: randomization. A great virtue of randomization is that it
facilitates decisive resolution while accepting that reason can run out.75
Randomization allows a decisionmaker to embrace any form of indeterminacy without suffering a destructive stalemate and without ignoring or distorting the value of any variable relevant to the merits. Decisions do not tend to improve when a random variable is thrown into
the mix of relevant variables, and so a decisionmaker is probably not
missing anything when she first tries to solve a problem on the merits
74 In the case of seven five-value variables, there are 78,125 permutations (57). I thank
Daniel Roberts for his help in constructing these tables of permutations. The relevant spreadsheets are available from the author upon request.
75 See Elster, Solomonic Judgements at 38, 54, 73, 75, 107-09 (cited in note 9); Samaha, 51
Wm & Mary L Rev at 21-22 (cited in note 63). See also Peter Stone, The Luck of the Draw *123
(Oxford forthcoming 2010) (on file with author) ("[W]hen claims are equally strong, no relevant
distinctions exist, and so an appeal to reason would accomplish nothing.").
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without randomization. A random variable located in the tiebreaker
position, however, can resolve major headaches.
Hence, if two actions are mutually exclusive yet equally preferable, the decisionmaker can give each action equal chances. In doing so,
she avoids distorting her evaluation of the situation to meet the imperative of judgment, the infiltration of improper grounds for decision, and
the unrealistic belief that reason can rank everything.1 Randomization
suppresses no ties, yet it resolves them. Turning to a statistically equiprobable randomization device is not the only rational response to
indeterminacy; the decisionmaker could use any method that is arbitrary for picking one action over another," in the sense of operating
on a principle orthogonal to the merits. But whether the randomizing
device is statistical or orthogonal," it nonetheless provides a useful
and rational response to indeterminacy.
As a matter of practical reality, however, randomization often will
be unavailable. Occasionally the hindrance will be sadly pedestrian.
Consider the yield-right rule. It obviously works much better than drivers flipping coins, which would entail delay and coordination problems.
Probably more often, the hindrance will be cultural or political. This
resistance seems strongest with respect to adjudication on the merits,
where judges face not only reversal but also professional discipline if
they flip coins to decide cases." Of course, randomization is accepted
practice elsewhere, including case assignment lotteries within judiciaries.? But lotteries can be a politically explosive decision rule. Officials
who resort to them risk "the reproach of frivolity or cynicism.""
76 See Otto Neurath, The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive, in Otto
Neurath, Philosophical Papers: 1913-1946 1, 8 (D. Reidel 1983) (Robert S. Cohen and Marie
Neurath, eds and trans) ("Rationalism sees its chief triumph in the clear recognition of the limits
of actual insight.").
77
See Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 Soc
Rsrch 757,758-65, 773-74 (1977) (distinguishing "picking" from "choosing" based on preferences
and reasons).
78 See Samaha, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 10-14 (cited in note 63) (distinguishing these
concepts).
79 See, for example, In re Brown, 662 NW2d 733, 738 (Mich 2003) (censuring a judge who
used a coin flip to determine a custody dispute); New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Annual Report 84, 88 (1984) (disciplining a judge who used a coin toss to determine the
length of a defendant's jail sentence); In re Friess,91 AD2d 554, 554-56 (NY App 1982) (denying
the judge's request to restrain the Commission from proceeding against him because of the cointoss procedure).
a See Neil Duxbury, Random Justice: On Lotteries and Legal Decision-Making 43-84
(Oxford 1999) (collecting examples of lotteries in social decisions); Samaha, 51 Wm & Mary L
Rev at 29-53 (cited in note 63) (contrasting attitudes toward randomization in case assignment
and merits judgments).
81 Neurath, The Lost Wanderers of Descartes at 8-9 (cited in note 76). See also Elster,
Solomonic Judgements at 37 (cited in note 9) ("Rather than accept the limits of reason, we prefer
the rituals of reason."); John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 Cal L Rev 59, 110 (1987) (similar); Judith
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A recent illustration comes from Connecticut election law. That
state's statutes used to provide that tied primary elections would be
resolved by lot.M For at least fifty years preceding the 2006 election
cycle, there had been no ties in any Connecticut election and so the
provision rested in quiet obscurity. In that year, an incumbent state
legislator attracted a primary challenger, and the ballot-counting
procedure ended with each candidate receiving 457 votes. The incumbent prevailed on a coin toss. When she returned to the legislature, she
and the secretary of the state joined forces to amend the statute. "No
candidate should have to worry that a tie would mean a coin-flip," the
secretary later declared, "and more importantly no voter should fear
being disenfranchised.,," However weak this logic might be, Connecticut law now mandates special elections instead of lotteries to resolve
ties in primary elections.' The financial cost of a special election is a
rough indication of the political difficulty with randomization in this
particular context.
b) Relevant variables. If randomization is unavailable, an alternative is to place a relevant variable in the tiebreaker position. Often
this will be regrettable. To the extent that a variable relevant to the
merits of a decision is isolated from consideration unless and until the
other relevant variables cancel out, the decisionmaker is throwing out
potentially valuable information. Not every feasible system is firstbest, however, and informational sacrifices might have to be made.
The discussion here offers a way to think about the tradeoffs.
Begin by noticing an obscure benefit from using a relevant variable as a tiebreaker instead of adding it to the mix of other variables.
As shown in Part II.B.1, adding a variable to a decision rule tends to
drive down the chance of a tie-but placing that same variable in a
lexically inferior position tends to drive down the chance of a tie even
faster. The same variable will usually do more good against ties as a
tiebreaker than it will when treated like any other relevant variable.
Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 Cornell L Rev 603, 611 (1985) ("[Tlhe community wishes judicial
rulings to appear to be the product of contemplative, deliberative, cognitive processes.").
82 See An Act Concerning the Integrity and Security of the Voting Process § 46, Conn Pub
Act No 07-194 (2007), codified at Conn Gen Stat § 9-446 (showing and amending the previous
version of the statute).
83

Connecticut Secretary of the State, Tie Elections Can No Longer Be Decided by a Coin

Flip 2 (July 9, 2007), online at http://www.ct.gov/sotsILIB/sots/Releases/2007/07-09_07
NoMoreTes.pdf (visited Apr 24,2010). See also Susan Bysiewicz, Toss Out Coin-Flip When Vote
Is Tied, New Lond Day (Mar 31, 2007) ("Since the coin-flip, I have spoken with many voters who
express frustration and disbelief with the way the election was ultimately decided."). A third
candidate finished close behind the other two, making salient the thought that voters' opinions
had been disregarded.
8
See Conn Gen Stat § 9-446(a)-(b). Randomization is not gone from the system. If the
special primary election ends in another tie, lots are drawn. See Conn Gen Stat § 9-446(a)-(b).
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Although I am not aware of a mathematical proof for this proposition,
it holds for many situations.
Figures 4 through 7 display some results.- In each figure, one line
charts the drop in ties when a variable is added to the mix of other
variables, while a second line charts the drop when a variable is instead made the tiebreaker for the remaining variables. Figure 4 shows
results for binary variables that can only take the values 1-1, +11. Here
the chance of a tie is always zero when one of these variables is a tiebreaker. The dramatic quality of this effect is moderated, however,
because the chance of a tie is also zero in half the cases when such
binary variables are all mixed together. Depending on the number of
binary variables, a tiebreaker may not be necessary.
FIGURE 4. TIES WITH 2-VALUE VARIABLES (-1, +11
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85 Calculating the chance of a tie with only one tiebreaker variable is simple, once the permutations are set out for the other variables. The formula is the chance of a tie with the tiebreaker
variable alone (for example, 0.2 for a variable with equal chances of taking one of the five values {-2,
-1,0, +1,+2}) multiplied by the chance of a tie with the othervariables and no tiebreaker.
As in Part II.B.1, I am making the important assumption that the probability of each variable taking the value zero is just as likely as that variable taking any other value in the set of
permissible values. In the real world, these probabilities might be very different and sometimes
will not be known. The examples discussed in the text are instructive illustrations rather than
close approximations of real-life decisionmaking.
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FIGURE 5. TIES WITH 3-VALUE VARIABLES
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FIGURE 6. TIES WITH 5-VALUE VARIABLES
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FIGURE 7. TIES WITH 5-VALUE VARIABLES
AND A DUMMY (-1, +1)
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The results are more consistent for other types of variables. Figure 5 uses variables that may point in one of two directions but also
may themselves be indeterminate-that is, they take the values [-1, 0,
+11. Here the chance of a tie is never eliminated, but it is systematically lower when one of these variables is saved for the tiebreaking role.
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For example, if two such variables are relevant to the merits, the
chance of a tie is about 33 percent when the variables are added together but only about 11 percent when one variable is reserved as a
tiebreaker. With seven such variables, the difference is 18 percent
compared to under 7 percent. Figure 6 shows the five-value variable
cases, where each variable may point strongly or weakly in one of two
directions and may also be indeterminate. The results are similar, although the chance of a tie is lower across the board.
Not all variables have the same character within the same decision situation. Figure 7 illustrates one version of variable diversity. It
combines some number of variables taking the values [-2, -1, 0, +1, +21
with one dummy variable taking the value [-1, +11. Reserving this
dummy variable for tiebreaking purposes eliminates all ties. This variable can point only in one direction or another, making it decisive in
all cases where it is the only consideration. The figure confirms that
adding more five-value variables to the mix also reduces the chance of
a tie, albeit more slowly. Mixing seven of these variables still leaves the
chance of a tie at nearly 11 percent. Hence this combination of variable types follows the general pattern established above, with more
extreme benefits from the tiebreaker.
There is a downside, of course. Each of these decision structures
entails a decisionmaker ignoring information by secluding relevant
variables into tiebreaker positions. Segregating relevant information is
not risk-free. If a relevant variable is used as a tiebreaker, the decision
will be clearly free of error only when (1) the tiebreaker variable is
itself indeterminate, in which case it is unhelpful to the decisionmaker
regardless of the decision structure, or (2) the non-tiebreaker variables yield indeterminacy, in which case the tiebreaker will be considered and no relevant information will be discarded. In all other cases,
there will be something wrong with the result.
A serious concern is the risk of a missed reversal. In a number of
instances, the tiebreaking variable would have pointed strongly
enough in one direction to overcome a weak preference for another
direction based on the other variables. This risk can be calculated.
With respect to variables with an equal likelihood of taking one of the
five values (-2, -1, 0, +1, +21, the risk of missing a reversal by using a
tiebreaker ranges from 8 percent for two such variables to a little over
4 percent for seven such variables.6 The need for a tiebreaker of this
86 To reiterate, this calculation does not include cases where the non-tiebreaker variables
total up to zero; in those cases, the tiebreaker variable would have been considered anyway.
Instead, the missed reversal rate was calculated by counting the number of times the tiebreaker
variable took the value -2 or +2 when the non-tiebreaker variables added up to +1 or -1 (respectively), then dividing by the total number of permutations with all variables taken together.
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kind should exceed the costs associated with choices that are outright
incorrect on occasion.
A second concern is the risk of missed ties. Even if adding a tiebreaker variable into the mix would not have shifted the decisionmaker's choice from one action to another, this variable might have
generated a tie had it been mixed up front. Again taking the five-value
variable cases as illustrative, the isolation of one variable in the tiebreaker position misses a tie in 16 percent of the permutations for two
such variables and a bit over 8 percent of the permutations for seven
such variables. Of course, this risk is also a benefit insofar as ties are
problems; the tiebreaking structure is avoiding stalemate in a fraction
of all cases." Nevertheless, the best answer based on all relevant information can be indeterminate. Saving a relevant variable for tiebreaking purposes will artificially suppress a number of true ties.
A third cost involves incorrect magnitudes. Sometimes it is valuable to know not only which action is superior but also the degree to
which that action is better than others. Placing a relevant variable in a
tiebreaker position can interfere with such judgments of magnitude,
even if that variable would have neither reversed the decision nor
generated a tie. The tiebreaker variable might have nudged the decisionmaker even further toward one action, or back toward some other
action. Returning to the five-value variable cases, a tiebreaking decision structure usually results in an inaccurate magnitude assessment.
For two or three such variables, there would have been a magnitude
change 64 percent of the time by including the tiebreaker variable
with the non-tiebreaker variables; this number increases to 71 percent
for seven such variables.

Given the restrictions on the variables, this calculation covers every case in which the tiebreaker
variable is strong enough to reverse a decision.
Recall, however, that throwing another relevant variable into the mix also reduces the
8
chance of a tie, so using a tiebreaker has mixed effects on the number of ties.
I again exclude cases where the non-tiebreaker variables add up to zero.
8
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FIGURE 8. ERRORS WITH 5-VALUE VARIABLES
PLUS A 5-VALUE TIEBREAKER
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Figure 8 charts these three kinds of errors for the five-value variable cases. Figure 9 does so for five-value variables combined with one
dummy variable taking the value [-1, +11. Notice that in this last set of
cases, the missed reversal rate falls to 0 percent. This is the consequence of using such a weak dummy variable as a tiebreaker instead
of a variable with greater nuance. When a variable only and always
points toward one action or another, and when that variable can only
weakly favor one action over another, it can only alter magnitudes or
create ties when mixed with the five-value variables-given their character. And, of course, a dummy variable will break ties resulting from
the other variables 100 percent of the time.
c) Double counting. Because using a relevant variable as a tiebreaker is a double-edged sword, there should be a desire for less
tragic alternatives. If randomization is still unavailable, might there be
a way to use relevant variables without throwing out useful information? Double counting seems to be the answer.
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The discussion above assumed that a relevant variable could be
placed either in a lexically superior decision rule or in a lexically inferior decision rule, not both. But a variable can be made part of both
stages. Decisionmakers could consider variables a, b, and c during
their first cut at a decision problem, then break any resulting ties by
considering variable a once again. No valuable information is lost at
stage one. In this respect, double counting a relevant variable to break
ties is like using a random variable: neither requires the decisionmaker to ignore any relevant consideration at the first stage of the decision procedure. Meanwhile, reintroducing a concededly relevant variable to resolve close calls might avoid the stigma sometimes associated with randomization.
Double counting comes with a potential drawback, however, that
is not present with random tiebreakers. Including a variable in both
decision rules might make that consideration unduly important to interested parties. It might create incentives to excel on that dimension-or to select into an applicant pool-that are too strong from a

given normative baseline. Thus, if an author knows that readers evaluating her article will use variable a as part of a first-stage judgment
that might be decisive and also to resolve any lingering doubts about
its ranking, she might put more effort into writing an amusing article
than decisionmakers would otherwise prefer. Random tiebreakers do
not have this influence on behavior.
Problematic incentive effects from double counting can be addressed by reducing the weight of variable a, but this will come with
error costs. If variable a receives less weight within the lexically superior
decision rule to compensate for its reappearance in the tiebreaker position, then presumably some first-stage decisions will be skewed. There
can be missed reversals, missed ties, and incorrect magnitude estimates
because the weight of variable a has been depressed. Similar remarks
apply even when variable a ought to be more influential than other
considerations, as an independent normative matter. It is true that reintroducing variable a as the tiebreaker is one way to increase its influence. But this reintroduction will not affect decisions that never reach
the tiebreaking stage. To influence those decisions, variable a must also
receive greater weight within the lexically superior decision rule-and
this reintroduces the incentives problem with which we began.
89 Random variables might have other problematic behavioral consequences, depending
on how people react to unpredictability associated with randomization.
9 As Lee Fennell has suggested to me, decisionmakers could break ties by randomizing
across the relevant variables in the lexically superior decision rule. If this lottery of relevant
variables is weighted in accord with the relative importance of each variable within the lexically
superior decision rule, then it should avoid the error costs and could avoid the incentive problems
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Nevertheless, double counting will at least occasionally be the
best available tiebreaker. Its desirability depends on a comparison of
the error costs and incentive effects within a particular context. Under
certain conditions, a variable relevant to a decision on the merits will
have little effect on behavior. One such variable is chronological age,
which is an attribute that people cannot change. Although double
counting an immutable and easily verified characteristic will sometimes change the mix of applicants for a benefit, it will break ties, it
will not increase errors at the decisionmaking stage, and it will minimize potentially troublesome incentive effects.
Examples of double counting to break ties do exist. In the 1990s,
the United States Air Force evaluated new weapons systems with a
procedure that included double counting. Officials first screened defense contractor proposals for effectiveness, then evaluated the remaining alternatives based on a more detailed investigation of both
effectiveness and cost." In 2006, the University of California, Berkeley
announced an admissions policy with an analogous structure. According to the policy, all applications would be scored for strength, and
some applicants would be awarded admission at this stage. But for an
anticipated "tie-break pool," experienced evaluators would reread
those applications according to "the same array of criteria" used in the
first stage plus additional considerations, such as whether the applicant attended a low-performing public school." In both examples, variables appear and reappear.
Because these examples involve screening, however, they are not
within my core concern. At the end of the decision process, several
variables are in play to resolve a predictably high number of ties.
Moreover, the first stage of evaluation might represent priorities that
are not so much double counted as they are minimum standards. But
other instances of double counting for tiebreaking purposes surely
exist-or they ought to.

that I have raised. Such lotteries can be useful, but they conflict with an assumption of the discussion above-namely, that randomization is not feasible. Whether weighted or unweighted,
lotteries often face practical implementation problems. See text accompanying notes 78-81.
91 See Zachary E Lansdowne, Ordinal Ranking Methods for Multicriterion Decision Mak-

ing, 43 Naval Rsrch Logistics 613, 613-14 (1996).
92 Admissions, Enrollment, and Preparatory Education Committee, University of California, Berkeley, Tie-Breaking Procedures: Freshman Selection Fall 2009 and Spring 2010 (Oct 10,

2008), online at http://academic-senate.berkeley.edulsites/default/files/committees/aepe/tie
break 09.pdf (visited Sept 30,2010).
93 Part III.B.2 considers whether various presumptions in law sometimes operate as
double-counted variables even if they are not formally designed as tiebreakers at all.
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The foregoing analysis indicates features that a desirable tiebreaker should have. The best tiebreakers will minimize errors while
providing a decisive resolution when other considerations end in stalemate. Obviously the optimal tiebreaker for a given decision situation
will vary according to one's preferred goals and values, including the
relative importance of different kinds of errors. But we have learned
enough to outline the profile of an attractive tiebreaker, even when
randomization is foreclosed.
First, if a relevant variable must be sacrificed to the tiebreaker
position, it should be a relatively unimportant consideration. Categorical moral inferiority is obviously one form of relative unimportance.
But this feature was also suggested above by variables that could not
take values less than -1 or greater than +1.The conclusion is an extension of the case for lotteries as tiebreakers. Choosing a relatively less
important variable reduces the number of missed reversals, missed
ties, and inaccurate magnitude estimations. At the extreme limit, with
a random variable or truly orthogonal consideration, decisionmakers
will not lose any relevant information, and they are unlikely to skew
behavioral incentives in undesired directions. There may well be political hindrances to using nearly frivolous considerations to resolve stalemate, as there sometimes are with lotteries. People might be disturbed
when the decisive consideration in an important matter is so trivial.
But, if decisionmakers can get away with it, frivolousness is a virtue
for tiebreakers in the context of episodic stalemate.
Second, an especially good tiebreaker will be decisive. The discussion above presupposes that ties are problematic, so the best tiebreakers have the best chance of breaking all ties. A variable that will always and clearly identify one and only one action should be preferred,
all else equal. This feature was signified above by variables that could
not take the value zero. Although affected parties can alter their behavior in light of a predictably unidirectional tiebreaker, sometimes
these incentives will be not terribly problematic and, in any event, unimportant compared to the value of nearly automatic resolution of
socially destructive stalemates.
Third, variables that are controversial or otherwise costly to assess might be good candidates for tiebreakers. This observation is partly in tension with the value of decisive tiebreakers, but in some circumstances it will be best to confine a difficult consideration to a tiebreaker position. Tiebreaker variables will not be considered very often if ties are rare. Decisionmakers can then take advantage of a bifurcated decision structure to minimize evaluation of the most taxing
variables. Of course, if such variables are so difficult to assess that the
decisionmaker risks falling into another tie, there will be a sacrifice in
decisiveness. And if such variables are also relatively important to a
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sound judgment, restricting them to a tiebreaker position can result in
high error costs-partly because valuable information is often lost,
partly because practice might make perfect in a decisionmaker's ability to assess these variables. Theoretically, however, costly variables can
be too difficult to handle on a consistent basis and hence can be potentially good tiebreakers.9
Fourth and finally, a relevant variable need not always be sacrificed to the tiebreaker position alone. Sometimes it will be appropriate to double count a variable that was included in the lexically superior decision rule. Such double counting comes with the risk of undesirable incentive effects or, in the alternative, error costs. But double
counting may outperform the isolation of a relevant variable into a
tiebreaker position.
III. APPLICATIONS

With the forgoing lessons in mind, we are in a better position to
evaluate design choices related to tiebreakers. In some cases, the task
of evaluation is fairly simple. Consider the yield-right rule. Assuming it
qualifies as a tiebreaker, it seems like a good one. First, it uses a variable with admirable unimportance. Nobody believes that yielding right
or left at an intersection has moral significance." Moreover, nothing
important is lost in traffic law by imposing a yield-right rule only when
motorists are effectively tied with respect to the time at which they
reach an intersection. Further extending a preference for traffic coming from any motorist's right would delay many vehicles for no good

94 In fact, if errors are not distributed in a troublesome way, then especially difficult variables might be rough substitutes for random tiebreakers.
95 Perhaps an explanation for our yield-right preference is the longstanding rule for ships
at sea. See Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Rule
15, 1977 28 UST 3459, TIAS No 8587 (1972) ("When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as
to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep
out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other
vessel."); The Chesapeake, 5 F Cases 560,560 (CC EDNY 1867) (describing this as "a simple and
plain rule"). Captains' quarters were ordinarily built on the starboard side, meaning that a captain in his quarters with a window would ordinarily be able to see a ship coming from his ship's
"right." But in the United States, automobile drivers are situated on the left side of their vehicles.
On the other hand, there are less arbitrary explanations for the yield-right rule for ground traffic.
Where traffic must stay on the right side of the road, the vehicle to the right will more quickly
pass the line of crossing if both vehicles enter the intersection at the same time and travel at the
same speed. See Salmon v Wilson, 227 Ill App 286, 288 (1923). So perhaps yield right is a logical
extension of a first-in-time principle.
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reason." Equally notable, the variable is remarkably easy for drivers to
ascertain and it is cleanly decisive.9
In this Part, three more important subjects are investigated in
greater depth. These applications illustrate themes from the discussion
above. The first application highlights the difficulties of lexical ordering. It assesses affirmative action programs, which are occasionally
designed as tiebreakers even though this decision structure might not
make sense as a matter of first principle. The second application shows
the legal system responding to intolerable ties. It examines tiebreakers
within interpretive method, which judges use to avoid indeterminacy
in legal texts. The third application picks up on the possibility of effectively randomizing or double counting relevant variables. It involves
all of adjudication, maybe all of law. The question here is whether adjudication writ large might be usefully analogized to a tiebreaker for a
set of disputes left unresolved in the rest of social life and, if it can be,
how we might judge the character of that institution.
A. Affirmative Action
Affirmative action can serve more than one goal and it can take
more than one form. Even so, a significant strand of the affirmative
action idea involves conscious efforts to increase the representation or
enhance the status of people who share some characteristic, such as a
particular race or sex." The straightforward way to accomplish these
goals is conscious consideration of the characteristic of interest by
decisionmakers who have power to change the situation of concern.
Characteristics such as race or sex (or income or legacy status or
whatever) can be incorporated into decision procedures as relevant
variables. Although many people totally oppose the consideration of
such factors in some subset of decisions, my concern here is the best

See Partridgev Enterprise Transfer Co, 30 NE2d 947,952 (Ill App 1940).
There are exceptions. When four motorists traveling from different directions reach a
four-way intersection at approximately the same time, the yield-right rule itself breaks down and
someone needs to barge ahead or be waved through.
98 See, for example, Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective:Affirmative Action and the
96
97

ConstitutionalRhetoric of White Innocence, 11 Mich J Race & L 477,517 (2006) (relating several

definitions of affirmative action to "an explicit consciousness of race and some degree of preference based on perceived racial identity"); James P. Sterba, A Definition of Affirmative Action, in
Carl Cohen and James P. Sterba, Affirmative Action and Racial Preference: A Debate 199, 200

(Oxford 2003) (defining affirmative action policies partly in terms of "favoring qualified women
and minority candidates over qualified men or nonminority candidates"); Roberta Ann Johnson,
Affirmative Action Policy in the United States: Its Impact on Women, 18 Polit & Pol 77, 77 (1990)

(defining affirmative action to include programs that "take some kind of initiative ... to increase,
maintain or rearrange the number or status of certain group members usually defined by race or
gender, within a larger group").
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design for affirmative action programs where the characteristic in
question might lawfully be taken into account.
1. Options.
Among the significant design choices for such programs is
whether to use a tiebreaking decision structure. Two recent Supreme
Court decisions illustrate quite different designs.
Grutter v Bollinger" reviewed an affirmative action program for
admissions that lacked a tiebreaker. University of Michigan Law
School officials used race as one factor among many in evaluating
prospective students." That an applicant's race was mixed together
with a range of other considerations became a theme in the Court's
rationale for upholding the program against an equal protection challenge. The majority was satisfied with this kind of all-thingsconsidered individualized assessment for an institution of higher education that wanted to remain academically excellent and, at the same
time, at least somewhat racially diverse.o
In contrast, Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle

School District No 1'0 reviewed a race conscious program with a tiebreaker. One of the programs in question assigned students to Seattle's
public high schools. School officials collected parental preferences for
the placement of incoming ninth graders. For oversubscribed schools,
the program allowed siblings to stay together, then considered the racial
composition of the school's entire student body, and then considered
geographic proximity of the school to the applicant's home.103 In the rare
case that geography did not assign all remaining applicants, a lottery
was used.' This time, the Court invalidated the program against an
equal protection challenge, at one point emphasizing the program's
limited effects on school racial composition.'"4
9

539 US 306 (2003).

100 See id at 315-16.
10oSee id at 334-44. But consider Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244, 270 (2003) (invalidating a

university admissions program that gave a set number of points to racial minority applicants).
102 551 US 701 (2007).
103 See id at 711-13; id at 813 (Breyer dissenting) (noting that the plan did not apply to
transfer students). Seattle's assignment plan did not mandate a particular racial composition for
each school, but it did define relatively homogeneous compositions judged by white versus nonwhite populations and then attempted to moderate those extremes. See id at 712 (majority).
Whether such programs count as "affirmative action" is debatable. I use them to illustrate a
decision structure.
104

See Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No 1, 426 F3d

1162, 1171 (9th Cir 2005) (en banc) (noting that the lottery is "virtually never used"), revd, 551
US 701 (2007).
105 See Parents Involved, 551 US at 733 (concluding that the program was not narrowly tailored). See also Taxman v Board of Education, 91 F3d 1547,1551,1558 (3d Cir 1996) (invalidating a
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In neither case did the justices make much of the distinction between a tiebreaking decision structure and other designs, but this
choice did surface in Parents Involved. The majority distinguished
Seattle's tiebreaking program from the program upheld in Grutter
partly because "when race comes into play" in the Seattle program, "it
is decisive by itself' and "is not simply one factor weighed with others
in reaching a decision."a6 This logic is difficult to take seriously, however, except as an arbitrary basis for preserving some piece of Grutter.
The Parents Involved majority indicated its concern about the influence of race, but the decision structure is hardly a proxy for that. A
tiebreaking decision structure might mean that race is almost never
considered, while an all-things-considered judgment might mean that
race is always considered and habitually decisive. It all depends on the
variables in play and the applicant pool, not the decision structure
standing alone. A critic might nonetheless believe that this school district used race too often, but that is a different complaint. More telling
is Chief Justice John Roberts's less qualified statement that the district
should "stop assigning students on a racial basis."' This is consistent
with opposition to any consideration of race regardless of the decision
structure, without the logically awkward suggestion that racial tiebreakers are especially troublesome.
Conceivably, the best elaboration of constitutional doctrine
would make tiebreakers inapposite. Perhaps the importance of the
goal and the propriety of the means are unaffected by the choice to
place variables such as race or sex or income in a tiebreaker position.
At the same time, we should understand that tiebreaking and nontiebreaking decision structures are functionally different. These differences should affect nonconstitutional policy assessments, if not equal
protection doctrine.

race-based tiebreaker used to decide which of two government employees would be laid off);
Tevlin v Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 237 F Supp 2d 895, 899
(ND Ill 2002) (describing a program under which race was used to choose among roughly equally qualified candidates for promotion); Portland State University, Office of Affirmative Action
and Equal Opportunity, Employment Affirmative Action (2009), online at http://www.afm.
pdx.edulWHATSAFM.html (visited Apr 8, 2010) (describing an affirmative action program as
including a racial tiebreaker for qualified applicants); Henry Ramsey, Jr, Affirmative Action at
American Bar Association Approved Law Schools: 1979-1980, 30 J Legal Educ 377, 380-81
(1980) (describing a typical process of summarily rejecting and summarily admitting applicants
who appeared to be easy cases, then considering additional variables for the remaining pool).
106 ParentsInvolved, 551 US at 723 (emphasis added).
107 Id at 748 (Roberts) (plurality).
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2. Evaluation.
It would be odd if those who oppose affirmative action are more
strongly against programs with tiebreakers, all else equal. Relegating
variables such as race or sex to a tiebreaker position tends to reduce
their importance in decisionmaking. Seattle could have designed its
program to look more like the University of Michigan's, stirring race
together with other variables for every student applicant. But the influence of race and outcomes might well be greater with that design.
Again, there is no way to tell without knowing the constellation of
variables, their relative weights, and the attributes of the applicant
pool. Insofar as affirmative action skeptics prefer that race be less,
rather than more, influential in decisionmaking, they should be at least
indifferent to tiebreaking decision structures when compared to allthings-considered judgments.
The more interesting question is whether proponents of affirmative action should ever support a tiebreaking decision structure. One
hitch for them is feasibility. If proponents want to ensure that a critical
mass of some group is represented, and if they are also committed to a
relatively selective test for admissions and jobs and so on, then there
may not be enough potential affirmative action beneficiaries to
achieve both goals with a tiebreaking structure. When a variable such
as race or sex cannot be considered until lexically prior variables cancel out, and when there are only a small number of potential affirmative action beneficiaries who satisfy those lexically prior demands,
there may not be any benefits left over for the tiebreaker to award.
Program designers could make the lexically prior demands less selective, in order to reach the tiebreaking stage more often. And they
could reduce the number of gradations in the lexically superior variables, which would tend to lump more applicants together and increase the chance of ties. But under the conditions just noted, selectivity would be sacrificed in favor of diversity -for all applicants.
Even if a tiebreaking structure is feasible given the goals of decisionmakers, affirmative action proponents have reason to choose
another design. The core question is why a variable such as race ought
to be relevant, yet only relevant when every other consideration washes
out.' It is perfectly sensible for supporters to want such variables available for use in every case. We might say that if the variable is a plus factor for one applicant it should be a plus factor for every applicant with
the same attribute. This seems true regardless of the rationale for the
relevance of an attribute such as race, sex, income, or whatever-

108 See Part II.A.

2010]

On Law's Tiebreakers

1705

whether the program is aimed at capturing the advantages of diversity,
or remedying past discrimination, or accomplishing some other goal.
Affirmative action considerations can simply take their place alongside
other variables deemed relevant to good judgment. I am not aware of
contemporary proponents who contend that race or sex is a lexically
inferior consideration, as a moral matter, compared to factors such as
seniority or past performance or test scores or legacy status."9
Surely proponents have room to disagree over the appropriate
weight of affirmative action considerations; but these differences do
not indicate that those sympathetic to the goals of affirmative action
believe that, say, race is never significant enough to outweigh even the
slightest meaningful difference in, say, test scores. A tiebreaking decision structure represents this kind of categorical ordering. Seattle's
school assignment plan is, at most, a weak example to the contrary.
After parental preferences were gathered, only sibling status was prioritized over racial composition; and limiting extremes in racial composition was always more important than geographic proximity."o
Now, it is quite possible that affirmative action proponents can
be pushed into tiebreaking decision structures as a matter of politics.
Between the ardent supporters of critical mass and the hard-line opponents of affirmative action might lie a compromise in which race or
sex may be considered only occasionally and only in otherwise close
action
cases. This might not be a bad description of some affirmative
111
proponents.
for
result
moderates, and a potential second-best
But this possibility does not tell us how a principled position in
favor of affirmative action can deny the relevance of race or gender
for all applicants, except those who happen to be tied with another
109 Proponents of affirmative action can hold that a minimum level of competence is a
prerequisite to additional evaluation without believing that affirmative action considerations
should be the only tiebreakers for choosing among minimally competent candidates. One might
reasonably conclude that the ability to graduate from a university is a necessary attribute for
admission, regardless of the applicant's contribution to a valued form of diversity. The less iittitive proposition for affirmative action proponents is that race- or sex-related considerations bear
a similarly inferior relationship to many other factors taken into account after a minimum level
of competence is established.
110 See ParentsInvolved, 426 F3d at 1169, 1171 (noting that the sibling tiebreaker accounted
for 15 to 20 percent of the admissions to the ninth grade class in an oversubscribed school, and
that distance accounted for 70 to 75 percent of such admissions).
111 Some justifications for opposing affirmative action might leave space for such programs
when applicants appear equally well qualified. Thus, those who believe that market competition
generally drives out inefficient racial stereotypes in employment decisions might nevertheless
believe that such stereotypes can persist with respect to job applicants who appear tied. See
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production
and Race Discrimination,108 Harv L Rev 1003, 1073 (1995). In this domain, affirmative action
proposals might suffer less resistance, even if affirmative action proponents have no principled
reason to stop there.
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applicant on every other relevant measure. Nor does it tell us why race
or gender should never be used to produce ties or reverse outcomes.
As long as one believes that the consideration of these variables
makes the decision procedure better rather than worse, then placing
them in a tiebreaker position will increase errors.' If a tie would be
intolerable, then a more arbitrary variable might be used,"' or affirmative action considerations could be double counted to break ties." If a
tie would be acceptable, as when evenly matched applicants can be
both accepted or both rejected, then no tiebreaker is necessary at all.
In addition, proponents have alternatives to tiebreakers, at least
theoretically." One option is to evaluate different groups separately to
ensure that a quota or goal is achieved. Instead of creating a tiebreaker, a quota system creates two distinct decision procedures. Hence
proponents need not worry that an affirmative action tiebreaker will
be triggered too infrequently, or that other important indicators of
merit will be weakened too broadly. Quotas or numerical goals are
relatively simple extensions of a commitment to affirmative action,
but of course they are often either prohibited by law or unsustainable
in politics.
More realistically, affirmative action proponents can turn to allthings-considered judgments. These judgments may include race or sex
as relevant variables with adequate weight to achieve whatever goal
proponents have in mind. They are also the kind of judgments that are
(or were) acceptable to the Supreme Court. It is not clear that a tiebreaking decision structure will be viewed any more favorably by the
justices. Such structures could make controversial tiebreaking variables
more psychologically salient to judges and to critics of affirmative action, even if those variables are equally or less likely to be decisive. If
nothing else, a multifactor analysis of applicants can make the impact of
race, sex, and other variables more obscure."' There is no indication of
See Part II.B.2.b.
See Part II.B.2.a.
See Part II.B.2.c. Recall that a potential downside of double counting involves problematic
incentives for those subject to the decision rule. But not all variable values are subject to the control
of interested parties. Depending on which affirmative action considerations are used, applicants
might have great difficulty entering and exiting the relevant categories. Incentive effects might be
minimal, and an increase in applications from the targeted group might be helpful.
115 On race-conscious but facially race-neutral alternatives, see, for example, Parents Involved,
551 US at 788-89 (Kennedy concurring) (mentioning "strategic site selection of new schools" and
"recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion," among other methods); James E. Ryan, The
112
113
114

Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 Harv L Rev 131,135-36 (2007).
116 Commentators have long pointed to the potential significance of appearances with respect
to race-conscious decisionmaking. See, for example, Kenneth L. Karst and Harold W Horowitz, The

Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev 7, 14, 28-29 (1979) (dis-

cussing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as allowing affirmative action programs to survive,
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leniency toward tiebreakers in Parents Involved, anyway. So all-thingsconsidered judgments ought to attract support from affirmative action
proponents as a matter of principle, and perhaps strategic necessity.
Although the argument for designing affirmative action programs
as tiebreakers in a strict sense is relatively weak, it might be worth
pausing to consider whether the characteristics often singled out by
affirmative action programs might be good tiebreakers as a general
matter. The above discussion concentrated on moral reasoning, but
intolerable ties may also justify a tiebreaking decision structure. Is an
attribute like race or sex a promising candidate for tiebreaker status
when other considerations end in stalemate? One might believe that
these characteristics are basically "arbitrary" grounds for making
judgments about people."' Although contemporary observers have
shown that categories such as race and sex are not as easy to apply as
casual conversation tends to suggest,"' with additional specification they
are variables that are relatively easy to evaluate. They are probably easier to assess than variables such as future effort or intelligence. One
could also conclude that the use of race or sex to decide merits questions is sufficiently controversial, or so difficult to appropriately weight,
that these factors should be considered, if at all, at a tiebreaking stage.
But of course variables like race or sex are special today, in a way
that makes utterly implausible their use as instruments of rationally
arbitrary decisionmaking. They are not like coin flips or phone numbers or even phrenology. However defined, the categories of race and
sex have a unique history and political charge, and they correlate with
differences in life chances that many find unacceptable. If one of these
variables were consistently used as a tiebreaker within some domain,
we would be right to ask about the resulting patterns. If already disadvantaged classes would end up worse off, the tiebreaker would cause
gratuitous harm. If disadvantaged classes would end up better off, we
would return to the controversial normative questions surrounding
affirmative action. The objectives of affirmative action, it seems, are
usually too important to be implemented through tiebreakers in a

perhaps via disguise); John Kaplan, EqualJustice in an Unequal World: Equality for the NegroThe Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw U L Rev 363,388,407-10 (1966).
117 See Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57,66-67 (1986). Critics of affirmative action
sometimes recommend lotteries in favor of racial tiebreakers, see Pauline T. Kim, The Colorblind
Lottery, 72 Fordham L Rev 9, 12-17 (2003) (collecting such arguments), but the discussion in the
text is suggesting that random and racial tiebreakers might have something in common.
118 See, for example, Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 NYU L Rev 1134, 1145-71 (2004) (distinguishing
racial discrimination from ethnic discrimination); Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46
UCLA L Rev 1375,1427-32 (1999) (collecting human biodiversity studies).
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strict sense, while the variables relevant to affirmative action are insufficiently arbitrary to be attractive tiebreakers in general.
B.

Interpretive Method

While the foregoing concentrated on the moral ranking of relevant variables, tiebreakers in interpretive method can be motivated by
the conclusion that ties are intolerable. Across the history of modern
adjudication, apparently no judge has answered the questions, "What
does this statute mean?" or "What does this constitutional provision
mean?" with the answer, "I don't know" and left it at that."' When litigants will not settle, judges decide controversies one way or another.
They must have tools to resolve every close call. Interpretive method
is one place where this commitment manifests itself in a tiebreaking
decision structure.
1. Illustrations.
In describing how legal interpretation is supposed to work, one
set of sources or techniques is often characterized as lexically prior
to another. Hence a statute's plain meaning (somehow ascertained)
is said to trump any other consideration that might be relevant to
interpretation, such as the lessons of legislative history.'20 Consistent
with a lexically inferior ranking, legislative history is not available to
create ambiguity in statutory text-only to resolve it.12 Likewise,
some canons of construction are supposed to be consulted only when
other tools of interpretation yield doubt. Among the most famous is
the rule of lenity for criminal statutes, which is reserved for the closest cases. "The rule of lenity ... applies only when, after consulting

traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute."'2 A related practice is judges deferring to reasonable
119 See, for example, Watts v Indiana, 338 US 49, 62 (1949) (Jackson concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("I do not know the ultimate answer to these questions [about due process,
Court authority, and custodial interrogation]; but, for the present, I should not increase the handicap on society."); United States v Robinson, 324 US 282, 286 (1945) (Rutledge dissenting) (stating "I do not know what Congress meant" by a statutory exemption from the death penalty and
concluding that the death penalty should not be imposed due to vagueness). Compare id at 286
(Black) ("We do not know what provision of law ... gives us power wholly to nullify the clearly
expressed purpose of Congress to authorize the death penalty because of a doubt as to the precise congressional purpose in regard to hypothetical cases that may never arise.").
120 See Boyle v United States, 129 S Ct 2237, 2246 (2009) (stating that arguments regarding
statutory purpose, legislative history, and the rule of lenity were irrelevant because the RICO
statute was clear). See also Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470, 485 (1917) (denying that interpretation is taking place when statutory meaning is plain).
121 See United States v Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co, 287 US 77,83 (1932).
122 United States v Hayes, 129 S Ct 1079, 1088-89 (2009), quoting United States v Shabani,
513 US 10, 17 (1994). See also Hayes, 129 S Ct at 1093 (Roberts dissenting) ("Taking a fair view,
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interpretations of ambiguous federal statutes by federal agencies. If
the statute is clear (somehow tested), then judicial deference to the
agency is inappropriate.

As a formal matter, tiebreaking canons can now be distinguished from more flexible interpretive presumptions.12 These presumptions include judicial disfavor of retroactivity,'" preemption,'"
extraterritorial application,27 and invalidity.'" Such leanings do not
seem reserved for the purpose of breaking ties, although they might
be lexically inferior to plain meaning. Insofar as they interact with
other variables indicating statutory meaning, they cannot be tiebreakers in a strict sense. And as a matter of sheer logic, interpretive
presumptions cannot eliminate the chance of a tie. In fact, it is theoretically possible for an interpretive presumption to generate a tie when
added to other relevant variables.
In addition to doctrinal formulations, academic theorists have observed or recommended lexical ordering for interpretive problems. Ronald Dworkin famously characterized legal interpretation as a process
that combines fit with justification.29 The former may dominate the latter. Thus Dworkin has indicated that the best philosophical reading of
equal citizenship includes welfare rights, but that this outcome is currently foreclosed to courts by considerations of fit.'" Although he is at
odds with Dworkin on many issues, Michael McConnell's approach to
the text ... is ambiguous, the structure leans in the defendant's favor, the purpose leans in the
Government's favor, and the legislative history does not amount to much. This is a textbook case
for application of the rule of lenity."); United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 514 (2008) (plurality)
("Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to the defendant."); Healy, 43 Wm & Mary L
Rev at 570-74 (cited in note 10) (discussing canons of statutory interpretation as tiebreakers in
cases of ambiguity).
123 See Chevron US.A. Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837, 842-44 (1984) (stating the test in two
steps, the first asking whether the intent of Congress is clear and the second whether the agency's interpretation is permissible or reasonable). This formulation resembles a tiebreaker, strictly
defined, regardless of recent debates over when Chevron applies, see Thomas W. Merrill and
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833, 873-89 (2001), whether Chevron is a good representation of legislative will, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in
the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L J 64, 74-75 (2008), and whether judges
should do a lot or a little thinking at step one. The tiebreaker characterization is trickier, however, if Chevron is reconceptualized as having only one step. See Matthew C. Stephenson and
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va L Rev 597,604 (2009).
124 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 189 (Oxford 1996) (noting a
difference between tiebreakers for equipoise and interpretive presumptions).
125 See Landgrafv USI Film Products,511 US 244,272-73 (1994).
126 See Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470,485 (1996).
127 See Microsoft Corp v AT&T Corp,550 US 437,454-56 (2007).
128 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades
Council, 485 US 568,575 (1988). We might add the norm of constitutional avoidance as well. See
Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288,347 (1936) (Brandeis concurring).
129 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 65-68 (Harvard 1986).
130 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 122-23 (Harvard 2006).
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constitutional adjudication has an analogous structure. He contends
that the only judicial consideration should be fit-but because some
cases cannot be resolved on that basis, McConnell must have a supplemental rule of decision. He then recommends judicial nonintervention
to foster ordinary politics."' Another variation on the same structure is
Randy Barnett's version of constitutional construction. When the original public meaning of the Constitution yields indeterminacy, Barnett
wants judges to impose a presumption favoring libertarian results in
order to bolster the moral legitimacy of the document.'
These views are contested, of course. But it is conventional wisdom to believe that many interpretive issues are resolved by conventional legal argument while a more difficult set of controversiesperhaps made unavoidable by selection effects in litigation-are influenced by judicial discretion or ideology. Extreme versions of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior'33 are giving way to more nuanced views
that both ideology and preexisting legal sources influence outcomes.
And some observers seem content with an adjudicative system that
allows something like ideology to determine case outcomes after conventional legal argument runs out. As Benjamin Cardozo explained it,
judges have "an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a sense
... of 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos,' which, when reasons

are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall."'.

131

See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in JudicialReview, 65 Fordham

L Rev 1269, 1273 (1997) ("When the dictates of 'fit' are satisfied, the judge's role is at an end.").
See also J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va L
Rev 253, 267 (2009) ("When a constitutional question is so close, ... the tie for many reasons
should go to the side of deference to democratic processes.").
132

See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution:The Presumption of Liberty 49-52,

118-30,268-69 (Princeton 2004).
133

See Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model

Revisited 81, 111-12, 310-11 (Cambridge 2002) (claiming that Supreme Court justices "freely
implement their personal policy preferences").
134

See, for example, Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the US. Courts of Appeals 11-227

(Stanford 2007) (exploring various factors including standards of review); Brian Z. Tamanaha,
The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging,50 BC L Rev 685,688 (2009) (recognizing

that the key issue is how much, not whether, judicial ideology matters).
135 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the JudicialProcess12 (Yale 1921). See also H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept of Law 135-36 (Clarendon 2d ed 1994) (discussing a rule-generating function
of judges, at least at the margins of statutes and precedents); Frederick Schauer, Judging in a
Corner of the Law, 61 S Cal L Rev 1717, 1729-32 (1988) (connecting positivists, realists, and
Ronald Dworkin in their treatment of hard cases at the appellate level and suggesting that most
appellate cases might be "essentially non-legal enterprises"); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J Pub L 279, 280 (1957) (de-

scribing Supreme Court justices as making policy choices "from time to time ... where legal
criteria are not in any realistic sense adequate to the task").
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2. Evaluation.

Understanding interpretive method (or its exhaustion) as generating a tiebreaking decision structure prompts a series of questions that
should now be familiar. They begin with the question whether a "tie"
regarding legal meaning would be intolerable in the context of adjudication. Is it unacceptable for a judge to confess uncertainty and proceed
no further? This question is deep, and probably too deep. It calls for the
defense of a tradition of certitude and decisiveness within adjudication
that is longstanding if not unbroken-a practice that might include
enough motivated reasoning so that judges are rarely capable of experiencing uncertainty. Confessing uncertainty requires the decisionmaker
to feel it first.' Either way, a full defense is too difficult in this space.
Instead, I can offer two thoughts that make a defense plausible.
First, adjudicative institutions should be assessed in light of other
available dispute resolution mechanisms. Relatively few disagreements
will involve lawyers or courts, let alone final resolution by judges,' and
the type of disputes that are adjudicated might have been resolved by
another method such as negotiated settlement or arbitration. These
alternative methods can be equally decisive without the commitment to
determinate resolution of legal meaning. It seems easier to defend the
presence of one institution that guarantees a final answer regarding
legal meaning to all disputants who demand it when a variety of other
institutions provide no such guarantee. In this way, courts can help end
contests among parties who cannot find other ways to stop the fighting,
while also offering public information about law's content and thereby
preventing some number of future disputes, all without dominating the
socially necessary activity of dispute resolution.
Second, courts often will be acceptable locations for eliminating
legal uncertainty. Many details of statutory and constitutional law
have low stakes for society at large, or lack demonstrably high stakes.
This can be true even when such details are extremely important to
the relatively few litigants who find themselves in court. Telling litigants that the applicable law is irreducibly unclear effectively removes

136 See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U Chi L Rev 511, 513 (2004) ("[T]he mind shuns cognitively complex and difficult
decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, confident conclusions.").
137 See Richard E. Miller and Austin Sarat, Grievances Claims and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 L & Socy Rev 525, 536-43 (1981) (showing a winnowing process from grievance, to claim, to disputed claim, to the use of lawyers and courts). See also Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 123, 251 (Chicago
1994) (noting that courts can address only a small fraction of significant policy disputes).
138 See, for example, Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan L Rev 601, 624-29 (2006)
(reviewing empirical studies).
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adjudication from the list of reliable dispute resolution mechanisms
and shifts some of that burden to other institutions. Whatever arguments can be made for some manner of legislative remand,' it is not
sensible for a judiciary to refer every close call, no matter how socially
insignificant, to other lawmaking systems with responsibilities of their
own.'" To be sure, these observations tell us nothing about how judges
should identify and resolve legal uncertainty, nor do they justify a
judicial commitment to determinate legal meaning in all cases. Perhaps our system overestimates the cost of legal uncertainty. But it
would not be surprising if a large fraction of truly hard questions regarding law's content are best answered, somehow, by judges.
Before moving forward, it is worth noting a view on which "ties"
in legal meaning are impossible. The degree to which legal meaning is
indeterminate is partly a function of the operative method of interpretation. With a flexible understanding of "interpretation,".. the operative method might confidently answer all questions of meaning. This
point is an extension of Dworkin's "one right answer" thesis, although
Dworkin himself indicates that the uniquely best answer can be a tie.'42
In any event, the idea is that different methods of interpretation will
have different chances of producing indeterminacy.143 At the end of the
day, we observe zero legal-meaning ties in adjudication with respect to
any issue of consequence to the outcome. One might then say that the
interpretive method used by judges is free of ties.
This does not, however, obviate further evaluation of law's tiebreakers. Most important, there are lexical priorities within official
judicial statements on interpretive method that mandate a tiebreaking
decision structure. The absence of ties does not show the absence of
tiebreakers; the former can be a sign of a tiebreaker's effectiveness.
There is a fair question regarding the motivation for lexical ordering
within interpretive method. Perhaps this prioritization is the result of
moral reasoning rather than, or in addition to, a particular problem
139 See, for example, Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action
175, 188-89 (Knopf 1971); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Foreword: Demosprudence through Dissent, 122 Hary L Rev 4,40-41 (2008).

140 I have ignored arguments that courts are systematically better policymakers for a class
ot 'sues. To the extent that this is true, courts should be authorized to generate law whether or
not"'interpretation" yields uncertainty.
141 See, for example, Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in Jules
Coleman and Scott Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

268, 268-70 (Oxford 2002) (including text, original meaning, underlying rationale or basic values,
application to particular cases, and stare decisis).
142 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 279-90 (Harvard 1977) (arguing that
there is a single correct answer, even in hard cases, for each decisionmaker, but counting a conclusion that a case is "tied" as a single correct answer).
143 See Part I1.B.1.
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with ties in this setting. Perhaps the rule of lenity helps produce good
judicial decisions and yet is somehow so unimportant that it should
not influence any decisions in the absence of indeterminacy. In my
view, it is implausible that aversion to ties plays no role in the development of a decisive interpretive method in court. Yet some lexically
inferior considerations within interpretive method could be morally
and categorically inferior to others. A critical evaluation of interpretive tiebreakers is therefore appropriate.
How good, then, are the existing tiebreakers? Because interpretive method is a work in progress within judiciaries, and because the
actual determinants of judicial behavior are subjects of ongoing debate, a simple conclusion is elusive. But a few things are clear. First of
all, judges never overtly use randomization as an interpretive tiebreaker.'" Although this might be a mistake as a matter of ideal
theory, practical reasons do exist for a merits-randomization ban in
adjudicative systems.'45 Judges face a serious public relations problem
when they use lotteries and when their effort on a case cannot be verified by a relatively uninformed citizenry. And if there were no such
public skepticism, we might fear overuse of randomization as a docketclearing device. Assuming that the number of appropriate occasions
for merits lotteries is small, merits randomization does not seem worth
the complications. At the same time, courts forfeit the ability to break
ties on matters of legal interpretation with the irrelevant, decisive, and
low-cost device of the lottery.
It might seem strange, but one hope for current practice is that it
relies on nearly arbitrary factors to resolve difficult interpretive questions. Perhaps judges characterize these considerations in high-minded
fashion, as theoretically justified structural considerations or laudable
traditions,"' but they turn out to be variables on the verge of irrelevance. This could be something to celebrate. Unless lexically inferior
considerations are at most tangentially relevant to a sound conclusion
on legal meaning, they are strong candidates for presumptions and
other types of variables ordinarily used to answer these questions.
Again, a relatively unimportant variable can be given lesser weight
without demoting it to a tiebreaker position. The more arbitrary the
inferior variable, the more comfortable we should be.
The only way definitively to evaluate existing tiebreakers in interpretive method is to settle on a normative framework. The moral commitments animating these frameworks speak to what counts as a good
See text accompanying notes 79-81.
See Samaha, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 67-70 (cited in note 63).
146 See, for example, United States v R.L.C, 503 US 291, 305 (1992) (plurality) (referring to
the "venerable rule of lenity").
144
145
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judgment regarding legal meaning, and thus what counts as a legitimate
source of law and legal interpretation. These are famously contested
matters. Some commentators are happy to have judges consider a wide
range of sources and use a wide range of techniques, while others are
stricter. Where one stands on these controversial issues will influence
whether one believes that, for example, consulting legislative history is
categorically inferior to leaning against extraterritoriality.
Useful observations nevertheless can be made. We should be able
to agree that interpretive method for criminal statutes has developed
a powerful tiebreaker: the rule of lenity. The rule is extraordinarily
simple, making it cheap to operate and unambiguously decisive in
every applicable situation. Criminal defendants are easy to identify, so
the rule is effectively a single-value variable always pointing in the
same direction. Of course, judges disagree over precisely when the
rule ought to be invoked, 1 and they may not (be able to) follow the
tiebreaking decision structure of which it is a part. This structure requires mental compartmentalization of different variables along with
a willingness to accept indeterminacy absent the tiebreaking rule, and
judges will sometimes struggle with these requirements. Furthermore,
knowing that a narrower interpretation is better than a broad interpretation does not settle the precise meaning of a statute. Nevertheless, a judge's chance of resolving an interpretive issue arising from a
criminal statute well enough to decide case outcomes is effectively
100 percent once the rule of lenity is operational.
A serious question is whether lenity is so unimportant that it
ought to be cabined in a tiebreaker position. As with affirmative action, we do not see proponents of this variable denigrating its normative significance.'48 And there may be good reasons to prefer a rule of
lenity to a rule of severity, such as distrust of government and a preference for private ordering. Too good, in fact: the stronger those reasons,
the more difficult it becomes to understand why lenity is not one factor among many. If instead lenity is a poor value to use for interpretive decisions, then it should not be considered at any stage of the decision procedure. And if avoiding ties is an independent priority for
decisionmakers, lenity can be double counted. Lenity could be one
variable of some strength at the front end of interpretation, and a decisive variable is cases of indeterminacy. There seems to be no simple
and persuasive rebuttal to this critique.

147 For the view that judicial enforcement of the rule "is notoriously sporadic and unpredictable," see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev 345,346.
148 Unless "venerable," R.L.C, 503 US at 305, is a misnomer for "old or inexplicable."
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The situation on the civil side is messier. Civil statutory interpretation lacks a universal tiebreaker that can assure decisive outcomes.
Some considerations that may be lexically inferior to plain text readings-such as legislative history-are unlikely to resolve decisively

every close call if honestly used. Other lexically inferior considerations-such as Chevron deference-are decisive but do not reach every

issue of civil statutory interpretation. When no agency offers an interpretation, there is no agency interpretation eligible for tiebreaking deference. Although some lexically inferior considerations in civil statutory
interpretation may be fairly demeaned as relatively frivolous, it is hard
to belittle all of them.'49 It is especially tricky to belittle them without
proving their illegitimacy. This is the case with legislative history. Justices who are skeptical of legislative history have good arguments for
ignoring it completely,a while those attracted to legislative history seem
unlikely to confine it to a last-ditch tiebreaker position."'
What is most interesting is that, even on the civil side, where
there is no universal interpretive tiebreaker, no judge stops in frustration. Every judge reaches a decisive conclusion on every interpretive
question she faces. Even the most enthusiastic proponents of using
legislative history to inform statutory meaning have never ended in
equipoise. Yet by collapsing many sources into a single stage of decision, one would expect indeterminacy to result every so often. It does
not. This suggests a broader insight: any judge's formal description of
interpretive method probably will not capture the actual mechanics of
decision. Of course, there is nothing surprising about a gap between
official formulations of interpretive method and judicial behavior. It is
often only after a detailed discussion of case facts and procedural history that the Supreme Court will declare something like, "We start
[sic], as always [sic], with the language of the statute."'52 And judicial
precedent seems to act as a trump over other legal texts, at least when
judges are adequately comfortable with the merits of the precedent.

149 The importance of a tiebreaker variable depends on how often it will be used. If judges
regularly must resort to a lexically inferior consideration because the lexically superior considerations often yield indeterminacy, then the inferior consideration is not so inferior. To the extent
that lexically inferior considerations in statutory interpretation are frequently the outcomedeterminative basis for decision, there is less need to belittle them.
150 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in Amy Gutmann, ed, A Matter of

Interpretation 3, 17 (Princeton 1997) (rejecting the use of subjective and unexpressed legislative
intent as "incompatible with democratic government").
151 See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 85-88, 98-101
(Knopf 2005) (arguing that "overemphasis on text can lead courts astray, divorcing law from life"
and suggesting a mix of sources for statutory interpretation, perhaps especially in hard cases).
152 See, for example, Williams v Taylor, 529 US 420,431 (2000).
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But I mean something more than the mundane observation that
judges imperfectly describe their actual rules of decision.
Combining a commitment to providing determinate legal meaning with the reality of countless difficult interpretive questions makes
a tiebreaking decision structure extremely useful, or even essential.
When we observe unswerving determinacy from judges who do not
specify a tiebreaker, judicial practices probably are departing from
judicial prescriptions for interpretation in a particular way. Judges may
be psychologically unfit to experience such ties and skewing relevant
considerations to manufacture certainty, but they also could be finding
ways to break ties that are even better than canons such as the rule of
lenity. More specifically, we might hope that judges are engaged in
undeclared double counting.
Consider the use of interpretive presumptions. As a formal matter they are not reserved for use as tiebreakers, so they should produce ties in some number of cases. Every so often, the presumption
against preemption should just counterbalance every other relevant
variable in civil statutory interpretation. We know that interpretive
presumptions are never used this way, and yet we observe no recognized ties. This is true even if no tiebreaking canon of construction
appears. Interpretive presumptions might, therefore, occasionally operate as tiebreakers regardless of how they are officially characterized.
This could happen in two ways.
One possibility is that a judge will shelve an interpretive presumption unless and until other considerations leave her uncertain as
to the statute's meaning. An interpretive presumption can be stressed
at the end of an opinion and portrayed as the decisive consideration.
The presumption is the kicker for the court. We cannot be sure that
the presumption played no role until uncertainty was confronted, but
we cannot rule out the possibility either. In this scenario, the so-called
presumption may have been misdescribed. If so, it is a tiebreaker and
it is subject to the commendations and concerns raised above.
A second possibility is potentially more optimistic. Judges may
sometimes double count an interpretive presumption for tiebreaking
purposes. In other words, a judge might consider a presumption such
as aversion to preemption up front, along with other indications of
legal meaning, and then, if indeterminacy becomes a threat, return to
the presumption as a way to avoid stalemate. If so, the judge avoids
the sacrifice of presumably relevant information during the lexically
superior decision stage while also avoiding the problems of uncertainty in legal meaning. As I have explained, double counting comes with
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incentive problems, but it can reduce errors in adjudicating cases.
There is value, therefore, in judges departing from the apparent design
of interpretive presumptions when no other tiebreaker is available.'
And there is a sound argument for making the rule of lenity a universal presumption in criminal statutory interpretation, if it is to be considered at all, and for reintroducing that factor or another relevant
variable when tiebreaking is necessary.
C.

Law as Life's Tiebreaker

In a very loose sense, every law is a tiebreaker. By providing rules
to facilitate coordination, cooperation, zero-sum dispute resolution,
and order in general, laws help people resolve doubt and disagreement that would otherwise interfere with a well-running society. One
might therefore say that law breaks ties even as it serves a variety of
social functions.' As explained above, however, this understanding of
tiebreaking is wildly inclusive." It extends to all decision rules. The
better question is whether law can be usefully viewed as a tiebreaker
in a more strict sense-as a set of decision rules and associated institutions that are more-or-less lexically inferior to another set of rules
operated by a different set of institutions. Below I suggest that the
answer is yes. But I recognize that the fit is imperfect. Unlike the examples above, hard-line lexical inferiority is often less apparent and it
is not universal across all legal institutions. In addition, the tiebreaker
analogy works best for judiciaries, and these institutions interact with
others in ways that many tiebreakers do not. Indeed, this interaction
opens possibilities for the constructive double counting of variables
relevant to both law and the rest of social life.

See Part II.B.2.c.
This is also possible for other kinds of presumptions. See, for example, Clark v Arizona,
548 US 735, 766-77 (2006) (discussing presumptions of innocence and sanity); Maine v Adams,
672 SE2d 862, 867 (Va 2009) (discussing a presumption of ownership based on possession). Unfortunately, the manner in which such presumptions actually operate is at least as difficult to
ascertain as it is for interpretive presumptions.
155 Perhaps an expressive function of, or constraint on, law fits less well with a tiebreaking
characterization. See, for example, Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard M. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U Pa L Rev 1503, 1511-14 (2000) (defining an
expressive moral theory in terms of constraints on the public meaning associated with actions).
But some versions of expressivism present legal institutions as only one mechanism for expressing group values. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U Pa L Rev 2021,
2025-33 (1996) (investigating law as one method of expression for the purpose of changing
problematic social norms in order to, for example, solve collective action problems). The more
that expressive theories can be reduced or connected to other theories, such as coordination
theories of law, the better the tiebreaker analogy will be.
156 See Part L.A.
153
154
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1. Characterizations.
Several struts support the tiebreaker analogy for legal institutions
and, more particularly, for courts. The first is the manner in which ordinary people view and treat them. Whether or not people generally
prefer private ordering to other types of politics, our courts are far
from the first place that ordinary people turn to resolve their grievances. Many people have reported that calling a lawyer should be the
last resort for solving problems,'" and parts of the country have a
stated social norm against some kinds of litigation.' Litigation is not a
good reputation-builder, while criticism for failing to seek legal redress seems rare. Abraham Lincoln once wrote-and, more to the
point, people still point out that Abraham Lincoln once wrote"Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can."'
In addition to indications of litigation's backseat status in popular
opinion is evidence that people actually steer their claims away from
courts. Available studies indicate that less formal dispute resolution
mechanisms settle the bulk of all grievances before they reach a lawyer, let alone a courtroom. A classic survey by Richard Miller and
Austin Sarat reported that approximately 10 percent of perceived
grievances made their way to a lawyer and only 5 percent to a court..
Neighbors often talk out their differences, employers and employees
often accommodate each other, and injured parties often lump it157

See Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public:A Final Report of a National

Survey 235 table 6.8,240-41 figure 6.1 (ABA 1977) (showing survey responses ranging from over
one-third to over half, depending on the cohort). I have found no more recent poll.
158

See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in

Shasta County, 38 Stan L Rev 623, 681-85 (1986) (finding a social norm against formal trespass
claims for damages among rural neighbors).
159 Lincoln, Fragment:Notes for a Law Lecture at 19 (cited in note 1), quoted in, for example, Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 ABA J 274, 275 (1982); Shawn J. Bayern,
Comment, Explainingthe American Norm against Litigation,93 CalL Rev 1697,1699 (2005).
160

See Miller and Sarat, 15 L & Socy Rev at 536-44 (cited in note 137). See also Marc Ga-

lanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev 4,20-21 (1983) (discussing

survey results regarding consumers). Other studies use expert evaluation in an attempt to isolate
only legally cognizable claims for the denominator. See Consortium on Legal Services and the
Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice:A Survey of Americans-Major Findingsfrom the Compre-

hensive Legal Needs Study 7-8, 17-19 (ABA
downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf (visited
income people with "legal needs" either do
than they resort to the civil justice system

1994), online at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
Apr 24, 2010) (reporting that low- and middlenothing or use nonjudicial mechanisms more often
but showing that use of the civil justice system is

common for family matters); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U Pa L Rev 1147,1183-90 (1992) (reviewing

medical malpractice studies and concluding that victims rarely complain, perhaps because of
perceived litigation costs, including stigma, although noting that severe injuries and automobile
accidents seem to prompt higher litigation rates).
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letting their losses lie long before any judge tells them that they must.
Much of this pattern of behavior is consistent with simple models of
settlement when parties roughly agree on the expected outcome in
court."' If nothing else, preventable litigation costs encourage otherwise disputatious parties to split their differences. 62 Even if the United
States is more litigious than many other comparable nations, which is
an assertion subject to doubt, our courts are simply not in the forefront of dispute resolution writ large.'
Infrequency and unpopularity do not establish that litigation is lexically inferior to any other system, but additional features of modem
adjudication pull it toward the tail end of dispute resolution sequences.
These features are part of the official design of our judiciaries. Most
importantly, judges respect and encourage negotiated settlements.
The mundane yet fundamental truth is that a valid settlement
trumps preexisting rights to litigate the covered claims. Judicial support
for settlement comes in the form of an expressed preference for it in
civil cases, backed by usual willingness to respect these agreements
despite ex post complaints of irregularity or injustice. Whatever the
limits on contracting away litigation rights, there is no general fairness
check on negotiated settlements.' In a similar spirit, the federal policy
supporting many commercial arbitration agreements indicates that traditional courts have moved toward a tiebreaking role even for garden161 See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J
Legal Stud 1, 4-5 (1984). For more on the model, see text accompanying notes 227-30.
162 Consider Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter
(Nov 17, 1921), in Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 3 Lectures on Legal Topics 87,
105 (Macmillan 1926) ("[A]s a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else
short of sickness and death."). Having even prevailing parties bear most of their litigation costs
can be seen as a feature that pushes courts toward tiebreaker status. For a leading exception, see
42 USC § 1988(b).
163 For a review of the limited comparative data, see generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher
Demand, Lower Supply? A ComparativeAssessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 Fordham Urban L J 129 (2010) (concluding that individuals in the United
States seem to rely on legal institutions less often and that the country seems to devote fewer
social resources per filed case, but that Americans seem to face more legal problems per capita).
16 See, for example, Williams v FirstNationalBank, 216 US 582,595 (1910) ("Compromises
of disputed claims are favored by the courts."); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466
F3d 187, 202-03 (2d Cir 2006) (similar); D.H. Overmyer Co v Loflin, 440 F2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir
1971) ("Settlement agreements are highly favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are a means of amicably resolving doubts and uncertainties and preventing
lawsuits."). See also Shedden v Wal-Mart Stores, 196 FRD 484, 486 (ED Mich 2000) (citing
"scarce judicial resources"). Another rationale is confidence in private bargaining. See Hennessy
v Bacon, 137 US 78,85 (1890).
165 Compare class action settlements, and their agency problems, as an exceptional circumstance. See FRCP 23(e) (requiring court approval). See also 15 USC § 16(e) (regarding antitrust
consent decrees proposed by the federal government); FRCP 23.1(c) (regarding proposed settlements in derivative actions); FRCP 66 (requiring a court order before dismissal of actions
involving a receiver).
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variety legal disputes.'6 Although judicial practice is not so explicitly
promotional when it comes to plea bargains,' such negotiated resolutions tend to stick. Indeed, our judiciaries are not designed to handle
many more criminal trials without seriously cheapening the procedure
that they now offer. By the early 1970s, the Supreme Court called plea
bargaining "an essential component of the administration of justice.
Properly administered, it is to be encouraged."'6
Of course, settlement negotiations take place in law's shadow,1
and in this respect settlement cannot be insulated from adjudication.
At least as a matter of strategy, settlement and adjudication are related. But this does not undermine the analogy between adjudication
and tiebreaking. A lexically inferior stage of a decision procedure may
influence the behavior of players at an earlier stage without forfeiting
tiebreaker status. That a soccer team strives to prevent (or reach) a
penalty shootout does not affect the characterization of the shootout
as a tiebreaker.
Were respect for settlement the judiciary's entire settlement policy, however, the tiebreaker analogy might seem inapt. Judges can respect the settlements they come across without telling parties to negotiate before they litigate. An apparently high settlement rate.o cannot
prove that there is a judicial commitment to prioritizing settlement
efforts. Settlement rates are driven, among other factors, by the
amount of litigation costs that can be avoided, by the predictability of
trial outcomes, and by relatively low stakes for the parties. None of

166 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 2 (authorizing courts to enforce private agreements to arbitrate); Southland Corp v Keating, 465 US 1, 10 (1984) (recognizing "a national
policy favoring arbitration"); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic
Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 NYU L Rev 1420, 1426-33 (2008)
(tracking an increasingly pro-arbitration interpretation of the statute in the Supreme Court).
167 See, for example, FRCrP 11(c)(1), (c)(5) (stating that district judges must not participate
in discussions regarding plea agreements and authorizing district judges to reject them). But see
People v Signo Trading International,476 NYS2d 239, 241 (NY City Ct 1984) (recognizing that
New York trial judges may participate in plea negotiations). A guilty plea might be deemed
involuntary if the trial judge improperly encourages a deal. See McMahon v Hodges, 382 F3d
284,289 n 5 (2d Cir 2004).
168 Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971). See also Robert E. Scott and William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 Yale L J 1909, 1909-12, 1916 (1992) (asserting participant comfort with the practice and defending a reformed structure).
169 See Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950,997 (1979).
170 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, NontrialAdjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, I J Empirical
Legal Stud 705,730 table 7 (2004) (calculating that settlements were approximately 60 percent of
all final dispositions in federal district courts in 2000); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities
Redux, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 1919, 1955 (2009) (calculating a postcommencement settlement
rate of nearly 68 percent).
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these factors shows that judiciaries are designed to provide a lexically
inferior second-stage dispute resolution mechanism.
But settlement gets more than respect. If courts ever were indifferent to settlement efforts, they are not now. Over the last several
decades, as caseloads and skepticism about the virtues of litigation
seemed to increase, judges around the country developed techniques
for encouraging parties to settle claims."' Alongside the emergence of
an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement outside the courts,
the judiciary's own efforts to manage and settle litigation were among
the major developments in twentieth-century dispute resolution.17
Turning points were marked, for example, when the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended in 1983 to authorize explicitly the use
of pretrial conferences to facilitate settlement,' when parties became
obligated to discuss settlement possibilities at their initial planning
conference,"' and when the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1998 instructed district courts to adopt local rules requiring "that litigants in all civil cases consider the use of an alternative dispute resolution process at an appropriate stage in the litigation.".7 .
Trial judges possess a number of methods by which to make settlement more attractive and litigation less so."' For instance, federal
district courts can require parties and attorneys to spend time and other
resources on settlement conferences,"' they can demand that parties

171 See Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 Cornell L Rev 918, 939
(1995) (citing docket overload and litigation disillusionment as motivators).
172 See Edward F. Sherman, The Impact on Litigation Strategy of Integrating Alternative
Dispute Resolution into the Pretrial Process, 15 Rev Litig 503, 503-06 (1996) (discussing the
development of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution into the 1990s).
173 See FRCP 16(a)(5) (including settlement promotion as a goal).
174 See FRCP 26(f)(2).
175 28 USC § 652(a). District courts may, however, exempt cases from this requirement after
consulting with lawyers about how to define the exemptions. See 28 USC § 652(b).
176 See generally Manualfor Complex Litigation § 13 at 167-74 (Federal Judicial Center 4th
ed 2004) (discussing specific techniques); Robert J. Niemic, Donna Stienstra, and Randall E.
Ravitz, Guide to Judicial Management of Cases in ADR 1-10, 38-47, 128-35 (Federal Judicial
Center 2001) (discussing federal court-annexed ADR options); Jona Goldschmidt and Lisa
Milord, Judicial Settlement Ethics: Judges' Guide 70-73 (American Judicature Society 1996)
(listing settlement-promotion techniques). For court-annexed efforts in the federal courts in the
years before the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, see Elizabeth Plapinger and Donna
Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the FederalDistrict Courts:A Sourcebookfor Judges and Lawyers 3-6,60-69 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) (noting the popularity of mediation programs).
177 See FRCP 16(c)(1), (c)(2)(I) (authorizing district courts to compel availability to consider possible settlement and to use "special procedures" to facilitate settlement). See also G.
Heileman Brewing Co v Joseph Oat Corp, 871 F2d 648, 652-53 (7th Cir 1989) (en banc) (relying
on inherent judicial authority to penalize the failure to send a corporate representative with
settlement authority); Shedden, 196 FRD at 486 (ordering corporate officer presence at trial in
response to a no-settlement policy); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 Va L Rev 1117, 1126-62
(1990) (discussing a duty to settle imposed by courts on insurers of defendants).

1722

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:1661

explore mediation," they can have parties listen to the impressions of a
third-party expert through early neutral-evaluation programs,"9 and
they can set an early trial date to jumpstart negotiations.' Many courts
also increase litigation costs for a party who rejects a settlement offer
that ends up being more favorable than the result at trial."' All of this
makes negotiated settlement not just respected but also, in significant
ways, encouraged as a prior step in dispute resolution.
Settlement-promotion policies are not the only way in which law
molds courts into tiebreakers. Consider the rise of administrative agencies and the judicial response. The modern administrative state now
conducts an enormous amount of adjudication that might have been
lodged in traditional courts alone.'82 Over time, judges accommodated
this overlap in jurisdiction by accepting, or perhaps demanding, judicial
review of agency outcomes.' More than this, judges developed a doctrine of exhaustion that required aggrieved parties to seek administrative remedies before turning to the courts. The Supreme Court now relies on both the Administrative Procedure Act'" and a freestanding doctrine of exhaustion to constrain the timing of judicial intervention when
federal agency action is under challenge." While a § 1983 suit against a
state or local official ordinarily overcomes any obligation to exhaust
state administrative remedies,'" there is a notable exception for prisoner
plaintiffs,' and the Court's requirement for maturation of takings claims
178 See 28 USC § 652(a)-(b). See also In re Atlantic Pipe Corp, 304 F3d 135, 143-45 (1st Cir
2002) (recognizing inherent authority to require mediation efforts, with parties sharing costs).
179 See 28 USC § 652(a)-(b).
180 See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching toward Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 1561,
1592 (2003).
181 See FRCP 68 (regarding formal offers from defendants); Cal Code Civ Pro § 998 (applying
to both plaintiff and defendant offers);Tex R Civ Pro 167.4 (same). See also DeltaAirlines vAugust,
450 US 346,352 (1981) (characterizing the purpose of FRCP 68 as settlement promotion).
182 See Richard E. Levy and Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedureand the Decline of
the Trial,51 U Kan L Rev 473,473-77 (2003).
183 See, for example, Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667, 670
(1985) ("We begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action."); Crowell v Benson, 285 US 22, 51-61 (1932) (permitting agency adjudication of
fact questions relevant to a "private right" but with judicial review); Laurence H. Tribe, American
ConstitutionalLaw 285-98 (West 3d ed 2000) (tracing the wax and wane of the "private rights"
distinction); Richard H. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts,Administrative Agencies, andArticle 111, 101
Harv L Rev 915, 946-48 (1988) (recommending appellate review as the Article III-preserving
check on agency adjudication).
184 See 5 USC § 704 (limiting judicial review to "[algency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court").
185 See Darby v Cisneros, 509 US 137, 153-54 (1993) (explaining that the Administrative
Procedure Act governs exhaustion requirements for certain claims, while "the exhaustion doctrine continues to apply as a matter of judicial discretion" in other cases).
186 See Patsy v Board of Regents, 457 US 496,502-11 (1982).
187 See 42 USC § 1997e(a).
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has a similar effect."' None of this pushes all legal institutions into a
lexically inferior status, but it does make traditional litigation look more
like a tiebreaker than step one in dispute resolution.
This brings us to a smattering of jurisdictional and justiciability
doctrines under which courts stay their hands without tying them forever. Setting aside doctrines that demarcate separate spheres of authority for nonjudicial institutions,"9 some of Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" for the federal courts can be recharacterized as building
blocks for a tiebreaking decision structure." Consider judicial demands that controversies ripen before adjudication is appropriate'" and
that advisory opinions not issue in advance of concrete and pressing
conflict." Certain federalism-related constraints on federal jurisdiction have a similar character, although they divide one set of courts
from another. Recall that federal courts should neither interfere with
pending criminal prosecutions' nor reach federal constitutional questions when a state court interpreting state law might make an answer
unnecessary.'" Each of these doctrines permits courts to maintain
overlapping authority while moving judicial involvement toward later
stages of a dispute. In the federal system, at least, a tradition has developed in which the judiciary receives and maintains relatively broad
188 See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 US 172, 186-99 (1985) (faulting a § 1983 takings plaintiff for not first seeking relief via
zoning variances and an inverse condemnation action). If a state court actually reaches the merits of a federal takings claim while the claimant seeks state relief, a subsequent federal court
judgment might be precluded. See San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco,545 US
323,345-46 (2005).
189 The political question doctrine, for instance, does not make courts into last-ditch dispute
resolution mechanisms; its aspiration is to shut the courthouse door against a category of disputes that judges want resolved elsewhere. See Baker v Carr,369 US 186, 217 (1962); Jesse H.
Choper, The Political Question Doctrine:Suggested Criteria,54 Duke L J 1457, 1461-62 (2005)

(discussing the scope of the doctrine); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of
the Political Question Doctrineand the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 Colum L Rev 237,300-36

(2002) (describing the doctrine's weakening).
190 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch:The Supreme Court at the Bar of

Politics 111-98 (Bobbs-Merrill 2d ed 1986).
191See, for example, Texas v United States, 523 US 296, 300-02 (1998) (denying ripeness
where the state procedure to be protected had not been and might not be used); Abbott Laboratories v Gardner,387 US 136, 148-49 (1967) (looking for hardship in the absence of immediate
adjudication plus present fitness for judicial resolution).
192 See United States v Freuhauf,365 US 146, 157 (1961) (expressing concern over issues
that lack focus when not preceded by proper adversarial contestation); Felix Frankfurter, A Note
on Advisory Opinions,37 Harv L Rev 1002, 1005 (1924) ("[T]he legislature must be given ample
scope for putting its prophecies to the test of proof").
193 See, for example, Younger v Harris,401 US 37,43-44 (1971). Parties inhibited by Younger abstention may end up litigating federal claims in the Supreme Court on direct review or in a
lower federal court on habeas.
194 See, for example, Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman Co, 312 US 496, 499-502
(1941). Federal litigation detoured by Pullman abstention may return to the abstaining court.
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subject matter jurisdiction and, at the same time, tends to manage its
operations so that other institutions move first, if not last.' It is part of
an old, albeit contested, idea that "federal courts may exercise power
only in the last resort, and as a necessity."' 7
As many of the preceding examples indicate, federal courts in
particular emphasize their place at the back of the dispute resolution
line. To be blunt, federal judges are last-word freaks. The most famous
illustration is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution,
which, in the Court's view, is final and supreme." But the desire to
give the final word runs deeper than that. Federal judges have long
indicated that they would rather say nothing than submit to direct
review by other officials. The prospect of nonjudicial review prompts
federal judges to refuse to offer a judgment in the first place.' Otherwise they would lose their place in line (last, that is). A statutory
mandate that federal courts reopen their own final judgments
prompted a related constitutional protest in Plaut v Spendthrift Farm,
Inc.'" Rejecting this effort, the Court found within Article III a "fundamental principle" that protects the federal judiciary's "power, not
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by
superior courts in the Article III hierarchy." Perhaps every decision
leaves opportunities for a workaround, even if it is as inconvenient as
Article V or the appointment of new judges. But federal judges plainly
want their solutions for individual cases to appear last in time and to
be respected thereafter.
A final component of the tiebreaker analogy is more subtle. It is a
message suggested by several decision rules designed for hard questions-rules that share a preference for the status quo or for nonintervention. Some qualify as tiebreakers themselves. One example is the
preponderance of the evidence rule in civil litigation: the defendant
195 On the expansion of federal jurisdiction, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L Rev 1353, 1365-1414 (2006). For the
latest major struggle to retain judicial oversight, see Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 769-71
(2008) (preserving habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay detainees). On the differences with
respect to state courts, see generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues":
Rethinking the JudicialFunction, 114 Harv L Rev 1833 (2001).
196 Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Chicago and
Grand Trunk Railway Co v Wellman, 143 US 339,345 (1892).
19 See United States v Morrison,529 US 598, 616 n 7 (2000); Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18
(1958). That is, until new law is made via Article V or by the Court itself.
198 See Chicago & Southern Air Lines v Waterman SS Corp, 333 US 103, 113 (1948) ("[I]f
the President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it is
one the courts were not authorized to render.").
199 514 US 211 (1995).
200 Id at 218-19, quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 Case W Res L Rev
905, 926 (1990) ("[A] 'judicial Power' is one to render dispositive judgments.").
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prevails if the evidence of liability is equally strong on both sides.2mThe
entirety of civil adjudication is to that extent biased toward prior outcomes in other arenas of social life. On the criminal law side, we might
view the rule of lenity, as well as the demand for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as serving a similar value of nonintervention. 20 When we
turn to appeals, the message is much the same. Trial court judgments are
affirmed, not reversed, when the appellate panel is equally divided."' A
final pro-status quo decision rule for close calls applies in legislatures,
although it may be less decisive if the agenda remains flexible. Like the
rule for equally divided judges, an equally divided legislative vote normally means that the relevant proposition fails 0 Note, too, that these
background values, which I have labeled nonintervention or status quo
bias, can still yield cleanly decisive judgments on the merits. All of the
above rules accomplish this, especially those used in court. We cannot
say that the application of these rules removes courts from the decision
structure altogether. Instead, they help courts reach decisions in favor
of other dispute resolution mechanisms.
There are counterexamples, of course. Consider the ability of
states to mandate the death penalty when a jury concludes that aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise,20 5 along with the
vice president's tiebreaking vote in the Senate. Status quo bias is
hardly the rationale for these rules. In addition, the status quo can be
201 See Pennsylvania Railroad Co v Chamberlain, 288 US 333, 339 (1933) (explaining the
adverse consequence of bearing the burden of persuasion "where proven facts give equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences"). The preponderance rule is a tiebreaker in the loose
sense. It is more like a unitary majority vote requirement than a lexically inferior rule. See Part I.
Illinois courts used to allow a separate jury instruction to the effect that "if the evidence is evenly
balanced, then the jury shall find for the defendant," Alexander v Sullivan, 78 NE2d 333, 336 (Ill
App 1948), but contemporary thinking is that this instruction, however technically accurate, is
"slanted" and unhelpful, see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil § 4.15 (West). But see New
Jersey Model Jury Charges (Civil) § 1:121 (West) (including such an instruction).
202 See text accompanying note 122. Whether or not proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a
tiebreaker loosely defined, it supports the general point being made in the text.
203 See Warner-Lambert Co v Kent, 552 US 440, 441 (2008) (per curiam). See also 28 USC
§ 2109 (reaching a similar result in the absence of a quorum in the Supreme Court, except in
cases of direct appeal from district courts); Morrison Knudsen Corp v Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co, 175 F3d 1221, 1237-39 (10th Cir 1999) (holding that the appellant loses when the appendix is
incomplete and prevents review). Alternatively, this rule could be justified on grounds of clarity:
"reversal" might leave more confusion than outright affirmance.
204 See Tarr and O'Connor, Congress A to Z at 472 (cited in note 8); Robert, et al, Robert's
Rules at 392 (cited in note 4). An additional justification involves stability: approving motions on
tie votes might leave those measures open to wasteful reconsideration, assuming no agenda
restrictions, while defeating them avoids this oscillation. In any event, the current rule does not
stop advocates of change from tinkering with their proposal and bringing the revised version to a
new vote.
205 See Kansas v Marsh, 548 US 163,181 (2006).
206 See note 8 and accompanying text.
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difficult to identify, as when a candidate election is tied, two cars reach
an intersection at the same time, an agency's statutory interpretation
is defended under Chevron," or a judge on habeas review cannot tell
whether a trial error was harmless." But the counterexamples will not
eliminate a modest theme of nonintervention in law's tiebreakers-a
value that nevertheless produces merits judgments for particular disputes. And that theme softly reinforces the notion that legal institutions are not designed to be society's first resort for dispute resolution.
The tiebreaker analogy is admittedly imperfect. Legal institutions
do not generally demand an exhaustive effort at reconciliation within
other systems first. Some people are willing and able to seek relief in
politics or adjudication rather quickly. Nor do courts always cower in a
small corner of social life. Judges can be more forward than that."
Moreover, litigation is in one sense subsidized: filing fees are well below the actual cost of running the court system. Plus judges disavow
"coercion" of parties into settlement, leaving their power to avoid
merits adjudication weaker than it might be.2 10 Equally important,
judicial settlement efforts are often annexed to the litigation process
instead of segregated from it. This makes settlement less like a separate stage of dispute resolution. Finally, significant issues are not resolved "finally" by legal institutions or anyone else. Individual parties
might accept the fate assigned to them by court judgments, and so
their particular dispute might end, but broader normative and empirical questions can be given only provisional answers in these settings."'
As to those questions, court decisions are episodes in a cycle of debate
and less like end-of-the-line tiebreakers.
A useful analogy between adjudication and tiebreakers nonetheless survives these qualifications. The resemblance is clear enough
once we combine mainstream attitudes and practices regarding resort
See note 123.
See O'Neal v McAninch, 513 US 432,435 (1995).The same rule applies on direct review,
id at 437-38, but the application to habeas is less explicable as status quo bias. See id at 442-43
(stressing the danger of custody infected by constitutional error).
209 To take one example, the Supreme Court invalidated government sex discrimination
while the Equal Rights Amendment was being debated in state legislatures. See Frontiero v
Richardson, 411 US 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality) (using congressional approval for the amendment as support for applying strict scrutiny); id at 692 (Powell concurring) (objecting to strict
scrutiny given the ongoing ratification debate, although not to judicial invalidation of the sex
classification at issue).
210 See In re NLO, Inc, 5 F3d 154, 157-58 (6th Cir 1993) (holding that district courts may
not order parties to participate in summary jury trials); Kothe v Smith, 771 F2d 667, 669-70 (2d
Cir 1985) (holding that a district judge improperly sanctioned one party to a dispute for failing to
settle before trial). Actually, the anticoercion principle partly supports the analogy: if judges
always mandate settlement, adjudication would have no ties to break.
211 See, for example, Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich L Rev 577,653
(1993) (describing judicial review as part of "an elaborate discussion" with the public).
20
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to legal institutions, the respect for and promotion of negotiated settlement by our judiciaries, the jumble of legal norms that channel disputes toward administrative agencies and other forums before adjudication, the ways in which legal norms often skew toward nonintervention in hard cases, and the judicial commitment to giving only final
answers in particular disputes.
In fact, we can examine the most assertive-seeming instances of
judicial adjudication and find a prior stage of roughly 212the same dispute to which the judges were responding. Bush v Gore, for example,
came only after it appeared that Bush and Gore were nearly tied at
the ballot box.213 Many believe that the Court should not have intervened at any stage of the dispute given the alternative mechanisms for
resolution, such as the pathways marked by the Electoral Count Act.21
There is good reason to criticize the Court majority on this score, although the election might well have been contested longer and without a different outcome had the Court not intervened. But can we
imagine the Court announcing the victor before Election Day? Before
any machine or manual recount was conducted? " In the case that was
actually decided, respect for the Court's judgment ended a recountnot every count. And the judgment was the product of a practice
called judicial "review." 6
21

2. Evaluation.
As a matter of fact and by design, judiciaries tend to be late-stage
decisionmakers. From this tiebreaking angle, there are at least three
plausible normative reactions to the health of our legal system. Each of
them reflects an important theory of what law is and ought to be about.
The first reaction is dismay. Perhaps courts supply rational deliberation
on core public values, and perhaps they should not take a backseat to
inferior institutions. The second reaction emphasizes effective dispute
resolution rather than rational norm generation. It involves acceptance of, or even hope for, randomness in adjudication. The third reaction suggests a somewhat more optimistic conclusion. It is that legal
531 US 98 (2000).
See id at 100-03 (describing counts, recounts, litigation, remand, and more).
214 See Electoral Count Act of 1887, 24 Stat 373, codified at 3 USC §§ 5-7, 15-18; Bush v
Gore, 531 US at 153 (Breyer dissenting); Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, 68 U Chi L Rev
637,639,651-53,656 (2001) (suggesting that the Court had "a warrant to enter the political fray"
only "when no other institutional actor could repair the damage").
215 Consider Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, 531 US 70,78 (2000) (per curiam)
(remanding for clarification of a decision that required inclusion of some manual recounts).
216 See Adam M. Samaha, Originalisn'sExpiration Date, 30 Cardozo L Rev 1295, 1312
(2008) ("In our system, nonjudicial actors bear initial responsibility for understanding the Constitution's meaning.").
212
213
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institutions are inescapably and appropriately double counting social
values as they end disputes that are not resolved elsewhere.
a) Life as law's tiebreaker? For some observers, judiciaries fail to
perform their unique role when they leave center stage on issues of
public importance. Judges have a particular way of evaluating problems and explaining their conclusions, and a particular set of information on which they act. In their best light, courts open a forum for rational deliberation about the appropriate content of law using valuable data about the real world that is generated by disputing parties.
This heroic vision of judicial behavior is suggested by Bickel's wish
that judges would follow "the ways of the scholar,"m. and Ronald
Dworkin's perception that courts are a "forum of principle" often absent from the machinations of other institutions.21 On this view, neither private ordering nor ordinary politics can deliver satisfying answers to the deep questions of law's proper character; and pushing
courts into a tiebreaking role would be senseless.
Owen Fiss advanced a similar perspective even as court dockets
grew, the ADR movement surged, and judges ramped up efforts to
manage and settle cases. In an iconic article, Against Settlement, Fiss
characterized the mission of judicial adjudication as the development of
public values in a forum less affected by power inequalities. "Like plea
bargaining," he wrote, "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of
mass society .... Someone has to confront the betrayal of our deepest

ideals and be prepared to turn the world upside down to bring those
ideals to fruition."219 Although Fiss had little interest in devoting public
resources to solely private disputes, he wanted judges to forge ahead
in cases involving public values, or cases in which society's weaker
members claim that law mandates disruption of private ordering or
politics as usual.m- Judges should not be seen as regretful tiebreakers of
any kind, then, but as public officials authorized "to enforce and create
society-wide norms, and perhaps even to restructure institutions."22 At

217 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 25 (cited in note 190) ("Judges have, or should
have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar.").
218 Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 NYU L Rev 469,518 (1981) (arguing that
law provides a space for contestation backed by matters of principle distinct from "the battlefield of power politics").
219 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1075,1086-87 (1984).
220 See Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of.Justice, 93 Harv L
Rev 1, 30 (1979) (suggesting arbitration). Compare Fiss, 93 Yale L J at 1087-88 (cited in note 219)
(doubting that judges could correctly assign cases to adjudication and settlement tracks).
221 See Fiss, 93 Yale L J at 1076-78, 1085-87 (cited in note 219).
222 Fiss, 91 Hary L Rev at 31 (cited in note 220). See id at 34 (asserting the special independence and dialogic abilities of courts). See also Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 Harv L Rev
374, 431 (1982) ("[T]he quintessential judicial obligations of conducting a reasoned inquiry,
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the logical extreme, we might say that the crude bargaining of social life
ought to be a lexically inferior tiebreaker for debates not reached by
the more pristine rationality of the court system.
There is something magnificent about these claims, in my view,
and not only because they are provocatively idealistic. They point to
the right questions. Bickel, Dworkin, Fiss, and others dedicated to robust judicial authority attempted to identify valuable features embedded in the design of judiciaries that were not replicated in other institutions. One might disagree with their conclusions, or believe that
their analysis was incomplete, while recognizing that these scholars
made admirable attempts to draw institutional comparisons.2 3 Courts
are indeed special institutions with an ineradicable relationship to the
elaboration of legal norms. Performing that function is, for them, unavoidable. Even the Manual for Complex Litigation concedes that
"[s]ome cases involve important questions of law or public policy that
are best resolved by public, official adjudication."224
Yet legitimate doubts about the claims of Fiss and others have, if
anything, deepened over the years. One serious concern is feasibility.
To the extent that anyone believed judges could take a leading role in
a large fraction of important legal questions, experience has not
treated that hope well. Courts have too few resources for that. They
could never fully stop settlement even if they stopped encouraging it,
and they will never accept review of every significant legal question.
Even with unlimited resources, a heroic view of the typical judiciary-perhaps the extraordinary judiciary-is unrealistic. One part of
the problem is motivation, another is systemic, and yet another involves normative disagreement. Whatever capacity judges have for
high-quality rationality insulated from base politics, there is serious
doubt that judges actually exercise this capacity in most hard cases.M
articulating the reasons for decision, and subjecting those reasons to appellate review ... have
long defined judging and distinguished it from other tasks.").
223 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law 34-35 (Harvard 1996) (recognizing that the institutional questions reduce to practical considerations and results); Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch at 24-26 (cited in note 190) (comparing courts and legislatures in addressing the so-called
countermajoritarian difficulty); Fiss, 91 Hary L Rev at 1-2, 31-34 (cited in note 220) (comparing
courts and agencies on several dimensions relevant to accomplishing institutional reform).
224 Manualfor Complex Litigation § 13.11 at 167 (cited in note 176).
225 See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword:The Court'sAgenda-And the Nation's, 120 Hary L Rev 4, 9,49 (2006) (arguing that most Supreme Court adjudication deals with non-salient, even if sometimes influential, policies); Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 123, 251 (cited in note 137) (noting that the "physical resources and personnel" of the
judiciary are more modest than those of the political branches, "dictat[ing] a confined judicial
role"). Compare David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 Georgetown
L J 2619,2647 (1995) (suggesting that settlement is unavoidable and can be reformed).
226 See, for example, Mark A. Graber, ConstitutionalPolitics and ConstitutionalTheory: A
Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 L & Soc Inquiry 309,329 (2002).
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Judges must be appointed somehow, and the system for acquiring the
office, if nothing else, connects them to ordinary politics. Although
judges are not a representative sample of the population, they are not
especially well chosen to share the normative goals of scholars like
Fiss, either. Nor are judges likely to possess the expertise or dedication
necessary to perform a justifiably leading role in norm creation.
Courts are at most one institutional participant and, as we have seen,
they are often committed to speaking last rather than first. Finally, the
relevant norms are controverted. People disagree persistently about
the proper goals for judiciaries in particular and government in general, just as they disagree about the proper mix of bargaining and principle, deliberation and decisiveness, politics and adjudication.
For the most part, courts cannot, will not, or should not take the
lead in public law generation.
b) Courts as lotteries. Other evaluations of law as tiebreaker are
cheerier, although one of them will seem awkward at first. Accepting
the tiebreaking analogy, we can return to the bases for evaluating
tiebreakers developed in Part II.B.2, which emphasized normative
unimportance, clean decisiveness, potential costliness, and, on occasion, double counting. We might then conclude that adjudication performs its tiebreaking role well-if, oddly enough, judicial outcomes
are partly arbitrary, and if, in addition, judiciaries effectively double
count societal norms.
First of all, adjudication is ordinarily decisive with respect to individual disputes. This seems to be the minimum goal of judges, anyway,
whether or not they can achieve the final word on broader questions
of fact and value. These decisionmakers offer decisive judgments on
each question that they choose to answer, and participants tend to
respect those judgments. Moreover, adjudication might qualify as the
kind of costly debate over controversial issues that is best left for last.
A substantial price is entailed by any judicial process that aspires to
rational debate based on reliable information about the realities of
life. Adjudication is a unique venue for contestation, and no one
doubts that litigation is costly.
The challenge in defending adjudication as one of life's crucial
tiebreakers revolves around law's normative value. Remember that
sound tiebreakers often rely on relatively unimportant variables to
provide decisive answers. Hence, as legal norms better reflect fundamentally just norms of behavior, we may become less confident that
adjudication is a socially beneficial form of tiebreaking. Now, the idea
that the health of our legal system depends on its use of normatively
trivial decision rules is something less than intuitive. No official within
the system would associate with the notion that judicial adjudication is

2010]

On Law's Tiebreakers

1731

a rough substitute for randomization. But there is logic behind the
idea. It is built on a few simple observations.
The first phenomenon worth noting is a selection effect on adjudicated cases. With important caveats, it has long been suggested that
relatively difficult cases tend to be litigated and that the most difficult
of these tend to survive until trial and appeal. Other disputes can be
settled rationally and much earlier, at least if we assume that the parties' expectations about a judgment on the merits are sufficiently similar, that the stakes for them are comparable, and that the avoided litigation costs are sufficiently high.m Thus cases adjudicated on the merits are probably not a random sample of all similar disputes, and the
sample's peculiar character helps adjudication approach arbitrariness.
Nearly intractable disputes are theoretically most likely to linger until
judges and juries impose final judgment. These disputes, in turn, will
be least likely to have unique solutions that are uncontroversially optimal. Uncertainty among parties translates into higher probability of
litigation to the end and probably correlates with difficulty among
judges in reaching consensus. The outcome can be analogized to a
coin flip, at least from the litigants' perspective.
The point can be made, albeit less dramatically, for those not convinced of a strong selection effect. Whether or not the pools of settled
and adjudicated cases are demonstrably different-and the selection
hypothesis in strong form has suffered major challenges"-no one
227 See, for example, Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 4-5, 17 (cited in note 161); Schauer,
61 S Cal L Rev at 1722-23, 1726-27 (cited in note 135) (finding similar thoughts in Karl Llewellyn's work on appellate judging). For a discussion of the serious challenges for a model this simple, see generally Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities,88 Cornell L
Rev 119 (2002).
228 See Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 16-17 (cited in note 161).
229 See Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
EmpiricalTests, 19 J Legal Stud 337, 341 (1990) (noting that Priest and Klein's 50 percent hypothesis allows "one [to] model the outcome of litigated cases by analogy to flips of an unbiased
coin"). In fact, at least one evolutionary model of legal development performs just fine when
judges flip coins. See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J Legal Stud 51, 53-55,
61 (1977) (relying on a selection effect in which parties who favor the more efficient rule are less
likely to settle and stating that the model works if merits decisions are made "randomly").
230 For empirical challenges to the Priest-Klein prediction that the plaintiff win rate should be
about 50 percent, given their assumptions, see, for example Clermont and Eisenberg, 88 Cornell L
Rev at 150-52 (cited in note 227) (observing appellate affirmance rates on the order of 80 percent
and suggesting relatively low litigation costs and perhaps indignation as factors explaining weak
appeals); Eisenberg, 19 J Legal Stud at 338-39,348 (cited in note 229); Linda R. Stanley and Don L.

Coursey, EmpiricalEvidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J

Legal Stud 145, 149, 159-64 (1990) (reporting experimental data in which settled cases were not
meaningfully different, discussing strategic behavior and homoscedastic error variance as explanations, yet finding that less information does reduce settlement chances). One simple explanation for
unsettled cases despite a largely predictable result at trial is asymmetric stakes. See, for example,
Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 24-29 (cited in note 161) (recognizing that point); Rubin, 6 J
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doubts that the pool of litigated cases includes extremely difficult issues. There are too many disputes, complexities, unknowns, and goodfaith disagreements over means and ends for the truth to be otherwise.
From the perspective of critical theorists and modern legal realists, the
domain of hard cases is large when only conventional legal analysis is
available; for others the domain is smaller but still present. ' We
should not anticipate clear answers, regardless of the test for clarity, in
all or even most of the closely contested cases. In many cases, merits
adjudication will be operating in the gray zone of reasonable debate.3
Judges themselves cannot rightly believe otherwise, regardless of the
certitude on display in published opinions.' Reconsider in this light
Justice Robert Jackson's quip, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."234
Of course, judiciaries do not close their cases by overtly randomizing across the set of plausible outcomes. Judges publish reasons,
and juries are supposed to have them. Yet it turns out that merits
judgments are tightly connected to randomization, at least in the more
challenging cases.
Within the jurisdictional boundaries of each adjudicative institution,
judges and juries are typically selected at random.3' Some form of assignment lottery is now the norm. If all of these decisionmakers were the
same, the case assignment method would be irrelevant to case outcomes.
Legal Stud at 53 (cited in note 229) (emphasizing incentive differences for one-shot and repeat
players). But settlement in cases that many judges would experience as relatively easy may also be
thwarted by strategic behavior during settlement negotiations, optimism bias in one or more parties,
and a passion for public vindication, among other forces.
231 See, for example, Mark Tbishnet, Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United
States, 13 J Polit Phil 99, 108 (2005) (noting the moderated claims of critical legal theorists).
Actually, decision will sometimes be difficult, perhaps more difficult, when conventional legal
analysis is disregarded. Converting every litigated question into a "policy" question does not
necessarily simplify the matter. Consider Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 230-31 (Harvard
2008) (acknowledging that both legal reasoning and pragmatism can run out); Jack M. Balkin,
Deconstruction's Legal Career,27 Cardozo L Rev 719, 734 (2005) (suggesting that "social construction ... helped produce the internal sense in lawyers and judges that some arguments were
better than others").
232 For characterizations of constitutional choices, see Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 Colum L Rev 606, 663-64 (2008) ("[A] host of
constitutional design choices are subject to serious uncertainty regarding their influence on any
number of outcomes."); Samaha, 59 Stan L Rev at 625-29 (cited in note 138) (reviewing empirical literature for the preceding proposition).
233 Such opinions are sometimes at odds. Compare District of Columbia v Heller, 128 S Ct
2783,2799 (2008) (indicating "no doubt" that the Second Amendment confers an individual right
unconnected with militia service) with id at 2826 (Stevens dissenting) (asserting that "the Framers' single-minded focus ... was on military uses of firearms").
23 Brown v Allen, 344 US 443,540 (1953) (Jackson concurring).
235 See note 79 and accompanying text.
236 See Samaha, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 5, 47-52 (cited in note 63) (discussing the extent
of and limits on case assignment lotteries).
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But neither sitting judges nor eligible jurors are fungible, and every
practicing lawyer knows it. Because these potential decisionmakers differ in their competence and ideology, they would reach different conclusions in some subset of litigated cases. In fact, there is good reason to
believe that the most difficult cases are the ones in which competence
and ideology are likely to have the most influence3 7
Moreover, because randomization's impact comes through the
case assignment mechanism, no individual judge or jury must be irrational, nonrational, arbitrary, or even subjectively uncertain for the
analogy to hold. Each decisionmaker can be as resolute as humanly
possible. We need only debatable issues of fact or law plus a diverse
set of decisionmakers. Case assignment lotteries do the rest. When we
combine selection effects with a diverse set of decisionmakers assigned to cases by lot, we have a system that begins to approximate
random selection.
This is only an approximation, of course. Among other differences with overt merits randomization, many litigated cases nonetheless have a fairly obvious solution given an appropriate amount of
judicial effort. Plus the range of answers in hard cases that could be
given by the mix of official decisionmakers is not necessarily the same
as the plausible set of merits outcomes. Furthermore, the US Supreme
Court sits at the apex of the system and it does not sit in randomly
selected panels. This further constrains outcomes in other courts, even
apart from the limited mix of views that survives the judicial appointments process.? Hence, the judicial lottery is weighted and bounded in
many ways that distinguish it from a coin flip on every issue.
But the influence of assignment randomization on outcomes is
not really debatable. And so the tiebreaker analogy for adjudication is
a way to feel better about the influence of chance. John Coons told us
that "[p]eople resist having their noses rubbed in the randomness of
the system,"m' but we have cause for qualified celebration of it.
c) Courts as reflections. If the foregoing portrait of law as lottery
seems too sobering or too distant from ordinary perceptions, a third
perspective supplements the lottery analogy and provides more hope
for those concerned about arbitrariness. This additional perspective also
helps account for the experience of relatively easy cases in adjudication.

2
See id at 53-57, 64 (exploring the relationships among judicial competence, ideology,
and decisions).
2
See id at 53-66 (vetting the connections and possible disconnects between case assignment lotteries and merits randomization and concluding that the former does not fully track the
optimal domain for randomization suggested by ideal theory).
239 Coons, 75 Cal L Rev at 110 (cited in note 81).
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I refer to the thought that law's officials, including judges, often
act in accord with mainstream or politically ascendant policy preferences, and that this consistency might be a form of beneficial double
counting. To the extent that adjudication resolves the episodic stalemates of social life with faintly modified versions of the ordinary
norms of social life, we could say that law has subtracted nothing from
the lexically superior stages of dispute resolution while reinforcing
those norms and performing the challenging task of breaking every tie
that it faces. This characterization might be more comforting than randomization, and it too has substantial support in legal theory.
The law and society school of legal studies has been claiming for
years that legal norms track forces external to legal institutions.
General claims of this type can be found in the works of modern scholars including Lawrence Friedman, who sees law as essentially a mirror
of societym and these claims extend back through the nineteenth century writings of Friedrich Karl von Savigny on the relationship between
the volkgeist and law. 4' These claims can be maddeningly abstract,
with references to vague forces amounting to "the hidden voices of
the zeitgeist."242 But it is by now obvious that legal institutions are
not fully autonomous.
In addition, somewhat more specific assertions have been made
about the relationship between external and internal forces shaping law.
We have the traditional connections made between custom and negligence, 3 trade usage and contract interpretation," along with religious

240

See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law ix (Simon & Schuster 3d ed

2005) ("Perhaps it is a distorted mirror. Perhaps in some regards society mirrors law. Surely law
and society interact. The central point remains: Law is the product of social forces, working in
society. If it has a life of its own, it is a narrow and restricted life."); Lawrence M. Friedman, Law
and Society: An Introduction 107 (Prentice-Hall 1977) ("In the long run, society molds legal
thought in its image.").
241 For a review of Savigny's theory, such as it is, see Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft
Law, 54 Am J Comp L 499, 527-32 (2006). For an excellent conceptual overview of internal and

external theories of legal change, see generally William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence(II):
The Logic of Legal Transplants,43 Am J Comp L 489 (1995).
242 Lawrence M. Friedman, Law in America: A Short History 42 (Modern Library 2002)

(describing influences on nineteenth-century judges, which is particularly challenging).
243

See Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Non-customary Practice,and Negligence, 109 Colum

L Rev 1784, 1786 (2009) (explaining that the newest draft of the Restatement of Torts allows
parties to present custom evidence without it becoming dispositive); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property,93 Va L Rev 1899, 1930-67 (2007) (collect-

ing examples from intellectual property cases and criticizing the influence of custom therein).
Rothman points out that custom can be driven by litigation-avoidance preferences, see id at
1951, and there are obvious problems if courts then import such play-it-safe practices back into

the legal norm.
244 See UCC §1-205 (covering the relevance of course of dealing and usage of trade evidence).
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beliefs and the criminal law.24 Some of these connections may have
faded over time, but there is a vibrant line of scholarship that has softened the distinction between law, culture, and politics. This enormous
literature includes the observations of political scientists that judges
usually will not push beyond the boundaries of the political main26
stream246 and the sense of social-movement legal historians that public
and political discourse is linked to doctrinal development, including
constitutional doctrine." Indeed, there is a logical affinity between
these efforts and the selection effect studies: both identify chains of
causation leading far beyond courthouse doors.
Although the connection between nonlegal forces and legal institutions can be much better understood, along with the foggy boundary
between nonlegal and legal institutions, a relationship certainly exists.
As legal institutions including courts adopt or adapt ideas from other
locations, a kind of double counting takes place. At an earlier stage in
a dispute, parties make claims relying in part on conventional morality
and typical practice but find themselves unable to settle their disagreements. Occasionally these unresolved disputes find their way to a
judge, perhaps after some other legal official has intervened, but without cutting loose the influence of nonlegal morality and what seems
normal for the circumstances.
Courts are not simply reflecting external social or political norms.
The relationship is plainly more nuanced than that. What seems right
and ordinary outside of legal institutions is influenced by the policy of
legal institutions. Furthermore, not every mainstream norm has a mirror image in the reasoning processes of judges and jurors; the conventions of legal argument surely affect the implementation of those
norms. The resulting slippage between social norms and legal norms
245 See, for example, Alan Watson, Legal Transplants:AnApproach to ComparativeLaw 66-69
(Georgia 2d ed 1993) (investigating reliance on, and deviations from, biblical commands in the
formal law of Massachusetts Bay Colony).
246 See, for example, Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 225 (Chicago 1960);
Dahl, 6 J Pub L at 281 (cited in note 135) (finding that Court policy ultimately converges with the
positions of national governing coalitions). See also Dean Alfange, The Supreme Court and the
NationalWill 220-21 (Doubleday 1937). For a recent study in the same spirit by a law professor, see
Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court
and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 367-76 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009).
247 See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-BasedSocial Movements
on ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich L Rev 2062,2064 (2002); Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 Cal L Rev 1323,1323 (2006) ("Social movement conflict, enabled and constrained by
constitutional culture, can create new forms of constitutional understanding."); Reva B. Siegel, Dead
or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191, 201-36 (2008).
See also Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation,24 Const Comment 701,
724 (2007) ("[Tlhere is no view from nowhere in constitutional law, no place for a Justice to stand
that is divorced from the culture and society in which the Court operates.").
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should be appreciated. Otherwise there would be, if no other danger, a
risk of legal institutions mindlessly reincorporating play-it-safe norms of
behavior that the law helped prompt. That would create a destructive
feedback loop. And if courts only mimicked external norms, it would be
unclear how they could resolve all disputes that survive to litigation.
We can now view courts as tiebreakers and their tiebreakers as
partly redundant -different enough from the norms of ordinary life to
end residual disputes effectively, and yet similar enough to share
whatever strengths and legitimacy they have. The subset of people
who end up as judges will not share every value and perception of a
more general public, to be sure. But these differences help resolve
disputes that last until they reach a courtroom, and the commitments
and worldviews of sitting judges usually will be in the vicinity of everyone else's. Judicial selection processes and other political and cultural forces assure it. Case assignment lotteries are still driving results
in a number of cases, given diversity on the bench, yet the overall pattern of judgments will tend to remain within a mainstream boundary.
This is not an unqualified endorsement of the system or mainstream
norms. To the extent that the norms from which judges and jurors
draw are imperfect, however, the target of concern must be far broader than our judiciaries.
A final thought in this path involves incentive effects. The major
trouble with double counting a normatively relevant variable to break
ties is the possibility that actors will be too powerfully incentivized to
satisfy (or appear to satisfy) the double counted variable.248 Knowing
that a variable will be reintroduced at a tiebreaking stage with some
probability makes the variable that much more significant to interested
parties. Nor can there be an assurance that sociolegal norms will be impervious to manipulation, and we must admit the normative imperfection of at least some of these rules. Perhaps this problematic effect is
simply a tolerable price to pay for a decisive dispute resolution system.
But also worth reemphasizing is the rarity of litigation and the likely lack of knowledge regarding the specifics of legal norms among
many. That legal norms are often not shockingly different from social
norms does not mean that ordinary people pay attention to the former
in conducting their everyday lives. For individuals who end up in contact with the judicial system, often the prospect of litigation was dim
and unimportant to their behavior. Insofar as litigation strikes like
lightning, incentive effects from double counting will not be significant.
In the end, however, we should be willing to recognize that few
tiebreakers for social decisions are associated with perfect worlds.
248

See Part II.B.2.c.
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And, unlike game designers, we are not engaged in the entertainment
business here. Both tiebreaking decision structures and the particular
tiebreakers that they employ are typically considered the best available response to an environment falling short of ideal. Legal institutions are no different.

No one of these three perspectives is the complete story, of
course. Rationality, randomness, and reflection of social forces each
characterize only one facet of our legal institutions, so none of them
fully captures the role of law and adjudication in our society. Perhaps
the combination of veritable randomization and double counting will
overcome any misgivings associated with adjudication's demotion to
late stages of dispute resolution. I find this conclusion attractive. But
the analytic framework is more important than anyone's conclusion
on this score. Likening legal institutions to tiebreakers should instigate
a serious evaluation of these competing perspectives, and on the terms
established in this Article for evaluating all kinds of tiebreakers. At its
best, then, the tiebreaker analogy offers a fresh way to think about
legal institutions and a sensible way to judge them.
CONCLUSION

A tiebreaker can usefully be defined as a type of lexically inferior
decision rule that ranks options when a lexically superior rule breaks
down. The tradeoffs involved in constructing such decision structures
prompt the question whether a tie would be truly intolerable and, if
so, whether ties can be prevented by adjustments to a unitary decision
rule. If such adjustments are impossible or inadequate, then the consequences of various tiebreakers are now clearer: random variables
with their political problems, relevant variables with their error costs,
and double-counted variables with their potential incentive effects.
These insights are significant for a variety of legal questions. Tiebreakers are part of decisionmaking within legal institutions today,
and legal institutions themselves can be evaluated as tiebreakers.
Whatever conclusions one might reach on the particular applications
explored above, this Article offers a way to identify and assess tiebreaking decision structures. And whatever nuances remain to be explored, the general analytic framework presented here is enough to
bring a unique and theoretically neglected tool for decisionmaking
into the fold of legal studies.
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